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 Job applicants and hiring organizations bring a host of goals with them to the 
staffing process. This can lead to dysfunction as these goals have the potential to conflict 
on a within-entity basis (e.g. a job applicant has two goals that may conflict) and a 
between-entity basis (e.g., a job applicant’s goal conflicts with an organization’s goal). 
However, I draw upon social exchange theory to examine how organizational actions 
surrounding an especially valuable strategic resource during recruitment—information—
might resolve the multiple conflicting goals of both organizations and job applicants. 
Based on social exchange theory, I argue that organizations can fulfill both their own 
goals as well as applicant goals by managing their provision of information-based 
resources (i.e., positive diagnostic information seeking) and costs (i.e., negative 
diagnostic information seeking) to applicants. In doing so, I theorize that organizations 
increase applicant levels of felt obligation which acts as a social exchange mechanism 
that drives applicant reciprocation of information-based resources back to the hiring 
organization. I identify four likely forms of applicant information-based reciprocation: 
the establishment of self-imposed decision deadlines and the minimization of these 
deadlines, more positive word of mouth, less negative word of mouth, and less applicant 
faking. I test this theory utilizing a multi-method approach with an experiment and a field 
study. Results provide little support for the proposed hypotheses. These results are 






The recruitment of qualified job candidates, which focuses on identifying and 
attracting potential employees (Breaugh & Starke, 2000), represents a complex process 
that has the potential to result in competitive advantages which, in turn, can mean the 
difference between firm survival and failure (Barney & Wright, 1998).  Decades of 
research on applicant recruitment stands as a testament to the multifaceted nature of 
recruitment (for reviews see, Breaugh & Starke, 2000; Rynes & Cable, 2003). The 
difficulties inherent in recruiting are likely due to the fact that organizations must often 
times balance distinct and somewhat conflicting goals (Rynes, 1988). On one hand, 
organizations are engaged in a “war for talent” (Michaels, Handfield-Jones, & Axelrod, 
2001) and endeavor to enlarge the pool of potential qualified candidates as much as 
possible (Rynes & Barber, 1990; Turban & Cable, 2003).  Indeed, applicant attraction, or 
getting job candidates to view the organization as a positive place to work (Ehrhart & 
Ziegert, 2005), is a critical goal of recruitment (Breaugh & Starke, 2000) and has been 
meta-analytically linked to important outcomes such as job acceptance intentions and 
eventual job choice (Chapman, Uggerslev, Carroll, Piasentin, & Jones, 2005). On the 
other hand, organizations are also simultaneously attempting to screen out weak job 
candidates based on personality profiles (Hogan, Hogan, & Roberts, 1996; Tett, Jackson, 
& Rothstein, 1991), poor person-organization fit (Bowen, Ledford, & Nathan, 1991; 
Cable & Judge, 1997), or a host of other criteria—a process known as selection  (Hough 
& Oswald, 2000).  
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Adding to this complexity are the multiple diverse goals that job seekers bring to 
the recruiting process (Kanfer, Wanberg, & Kantrowitz, 2001; Wanberg, Kanfer, & 
Rotundo, 1999). For one, job applicants want to work for a good company. Meta-
analyses (Uggerslev, Fassina, & Kraichy, 2012) suggest that job seekers are generally 
more attracted to organizations with a certain set of desirable characteristics, such as 
prestige/reputation (ρ = .53), quality of employee–organization relationships and 
organizational support (ρ = .58), job security (ρ = .25), and location (ρ = .22)1. As a 
result, job applicants may conserve their limited resources (Kanfer et al., 2001) and only 
direct effort toward obtaining employment with desirable organizations. However, 
compared to the prospect of unemployment, job seekers are likely to be simultaneously 
concerned with simply finding employment, regardless of the desirability of the 
organization (Boswell, Zimmerman, & Swider, 2012).  
Further complications can arise when the multiple goals that job applicants hold 
do not align with those of the organization and vice versa. For example, potentially 
conflicting goals may pressure job candidates to engage in uncooperative behavior such 
as faking (Levashina & Campion, 2007) to increase their chances of receiving a job offer 
or responding slowly to existing job offers in hopes that a more desirable one will be 
extended. In turn, this behavior opens up potential areas of conflict between hiring 
organizations and job applicants as faking may undermine the validity of a wide variety 
of selection procedures that depend on accurate information about job applicants 
(Schmidt & Hunter, 1998) and slow applicant responses to job offers may disrupt 
recruitment efforts that attempt to balance the logistics associated with multiple job 
                                                     
1 ρ = coefficient corrected for sampling error and unreliability of the predictor and criterion 
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candidates. In summary, the numerous (and seemingly irreconcilable) objectives of 
organizations and job candidates have the potential to impact organizational behavior 
(e.g, Rynes, 1989; Stevens, 1998a) as well as negatively affect applicant reactions (e.g., 
Barber, Hollenbeck, Tower, & Phillips, 1994; Connerley & Rynes, 1997; Turban & 
Dougherty, 1992).  
 Although the myriad of conflicting objectives operating during the recruiting 
process would appear to prohibit organizations from effectively attracting and selecting 
candidates, social exchange theory (e.g., Blau, 1964) suggests that, under certain 
conditions, separate parties (with their own interests and goals) can and do interact in a 
cooperative and mutually beneficially way to establish meaningful long-term 
relationships (for a review see, Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005). Yet, we know little about 
the nature of resources that might be exchanged between applicants and organizations, 
the outcomes we could expect from a healthy social exchange relationship between 
applicants and organizations, and the critical mechanisms driving these effects. While 
social exchange theory has been successfully applied to understand a diverse set of 
research areas such as: sociology (Emerson, 1976), leadership (e.g., Wayne, Shore, & 
Liden, 1997), cognitive psychology (e.g., Cosmides, 1989), marketing (e.g., Bagozzi, 
1975), and networks (e.g., Brass, Galaskiewicz, Greve, & Tsai, 2004), it remains under-
explored in the applicant attraction and reaction literatures (cf. Ehrhart & Ziegert, 2005). 
This is surprising given that one of the first and perhaps most dominant models of 
applicant attraction and reactions to selection procedures (i.e., Gilliland, 1993) is 
grounded in organizational justice theory (Hausknecht, Day, & Thomas, 2004; Ryan & 
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Ployhart, 2000)−a predominantly social exchange-based phenomenon (Colquitt et al., 
2013). 
To address these gaps in the literature, I utilize social exchange theory to examine 
how organizational actions surrounding an especially valuable strategic resource during 
recruitment—information (U. G. Foa & Foa, 1974, 1980)—might resolve the multiple 
conflicting goals of organizations and job applicants, and ultimately lead to a high or low 
quality exchange relationship between these two parties. Information is an important 
resource for organizations given the crucial role that it plays in effective recruiting 
(Rynes & Barber, 1990) and selection (Schmidt & Hunter, 1998). For instance, the extent 
to which a job candidate provides honest information likely serves a strategic purpose for 
organizations as they try to select the best candidate amongst all potential candidates 
(Levashina & Campion, 2009). Furthermore, timely responses to job offers and favorable 
word of mouth also represent possible information-based resources likely to benefit 
organizations as well. At the same time, organizations may need to simultaneously 
consider job applicant perceptions during any information seeking activity as the nature 
and extent of strategies that organizations use to gather information about candidates may 
have an impact on the quality of the social exchange relationship between the job 
candidate and the organization. For instance, seeking information that is diagnostic, or 
useful to organizations in hiring decisions (Herr, Kardes, & Kim, 1991), when it makes 
the candidate look undesirable may cause the job applicant to view the organization as an 
undesirable social exchange partner which can undermine reciprocation by job 
applicants.  
5 
As seen in Figure 1, I propose that the seeking of information by organizations 
during the recruiting process predicts the reciprocal provision of information resources to 
organizations by job applicants while fulfilling applicant goals. According to the 
reciprocation-in-kind tenet of social exchange theory (U. G. Foa & Foa, 1974, 1980), 
which suggests that individuals reciprocate information-related resources received with 
information-related resources in return, the seeking of positive information about a job 
applicant should ultimately lead applicants to intend to provide more timely information 
(i.e., job applicants will likely set shorter self-imposed decision deadlines), information 
that has a broad impact (i.e., job applicants will provide more positive word of mouth and 
less negative word of mouth), and higher quality information (i.e., job applicants will 
engage in less faking). On the other hand, job candidates will likely respond to 
organizations’ negative diagnostic information seeking by setting longer self-imposed 
decision deadlines, providing less positive word of mouth, more negative word of mouth, 
and engaging in more faking. 
Altogether, a social exchange approach to understanding information in recruiting 
and selection contexts shifts current attention from the content of the information that is 
exchanged (Earnest, Allen, & Landis, 2011) to the symbolic significance of seeking 
information as acts in and of themselves that have meaningful implications for 
relationship quality. Furthermore, social exchange theory has the potential to complement 
the predominant theoretical lens in the recruiting literature, signaling theory (Turban, 
2001; Walker et al., 2012). Whereas signaling theory emphasizes that job applicants 
primarily interpret organizations’ behavior as clues to predict how they will be treated if 
they joined the firm (Walker et al., 2012), social exchange underscores the fact that the  
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Figure 1  
Theoretical model  
relationship between a job applicant and a hiring organization starts, not in the 
future but, at the first point of interaction between these two parties. As a result, social 
exchange theory can explain applicant and organization activities that occur throughout 
the entire recruiting/selection process in addition to the final decision of whether or not a 
job applicant might accept a job offer. Relatedly, social exchange suggests that job 
applicant reactions to organization behavior likely include outcomes that extend beyond 
job choice decisions (e.g., job pursuit and offer acceptance) to the reciprocation of other 
resources that can also benefit an organization (e.g., word of mouth). Finally, a social 
exchange-based model allows for the study of recruiting and selection from the 
perspective of both the job applicant and the hiring organization, and not merely one or 
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the other (cf. Breaugh & Starke, 2000; Ehrhart & Ziegert, 2005). By utilizing a social 
exchange lens to study applicants’ reciprocating reactions to organizations, I answer 
general calls to more strongly ground recruiting and selection research in theory (Breaugh 
& Starke, 2000; Ehrhart & Ziegert, 2005) and specific calls to incorporate social 
exchanges (Earnest et al., 2011; Ganzach, Pazy, Ohayun, & Brainin, 2002) and 
information exchanges (Posthuma, Morgeson, & Campion, 2002) into these bodies of 
literature. 
 As an additional contribution, I detail how and why an organization’s information 
seeking strategies might lead to different levels of applicant self-imposed decision 
deadlines, positive word of mouth, negative word of mouth, and faking. To accomplish 
this, I outline how an organization’s information seeking might affect a social exchange-
relevant mediator—felt obligation, or the “belief regarding whether one should care about 
the organization’s well-being and should help the organization reach its goals” 
(Eisenberger et al., 2001: 42)—that drives reciprocation toward the organization. In doing 
so, I answer calls from researchers to focus attention on and explicitly test mediators in 
recruitment research (Breaugh, 2008, 2012; Rynes & Cable, 2003), especially those that 
have been ignored or assumed to account for previously observed effects (e.g., Ganzach 
et al., 2002). In addition, this paper answers calls to investigate the factors that might 
cause individuals to spread negative word-of-mouth (Van Hoye & Lievens, 2009). 
Finally, the proposed model further integrates the recruitment and selection 
literatures by outlining the interplay between simultaneous, and potentially conflicting 
yet reconcilable, actions typical of selection processes. Given that organizational 
activities can have both recruitment and selection implications (Rynes, 1989), the 
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examination of these organizational actions in one model explicitly addresses how  
selection activities might serve attraction purposes and actually affect applicant attitudes 
and reactions in an additive fashion. In this way, recruitment and selection functions do 
not act in isolation and, for better or worse, actions that are thought of as primarily 
selection focused do have implications for candidate attraction. In particular, I look at a 
broad class of selection activities, information seeking, and examine how some forms of 
information seeking (i.e., negative diagnostic information seeking; Connerley & Rynes, 
1997; Rynes, 1989) might negatively impact the establishment of viable social exchange 
relationships between job applicants and organizations. By doing so, this proposal 
answers calls to bridge the gap between the traditionally separate, but conceptually 








2.1 Goals During the Hiring Process 
2.1.1 Job applicant goals 
 The complexity of the hiring process is likely due, in part, to the fact that job 
seekers seem to have multiple, simultaneously operating goals (Boswell et al., 2012). The 
most intuitive of these goals is a desire to secure employment. Underlying this goal is the 
expectation that applying for and pursuing a job might result in the chance, however low, 
of receiving a job offer of gainful employment (Wanous, Keon, & Latack, 1983). This 
drive to obtain employment is captured by applicants’ perceptions of hiring likelihood, 
also known as the concept of expectancy, which is defined as job applicants’ expectation 
of receiving a job offer from a specific employer (Rynes, 1991; Turban & Dougherty, 
1992). Hiring likelihood perception is a motivational construct that applies to a broad 
range of job applicants, regardless of whether the job applicant: has a) never had a job 
and is a new entrant into the labor market, b) is unemployed and searching for a job, or c) 
is employed but searching for their next job or an additional job (Boswell et al., 2012).  
While hiring likelihood perceptions might vary throughout the stages of recruitment 
(Barber, 1998), meta-analytic evidence suggests that job applicants consider hiring 
likelihood to be relevant throughout all stages of recruitment (Uggerslev et al., 2012), up 
until the job offer is actually extended. From this perspective, hiring likelihood captures 
the perceived probability of achieving a very concrete goal of job applicants – getting a 
job. 
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At the same time, however, it is important to note that hiring likelihood 
expectations can represent a much more complex and multi-faceted phenomenon because 
they likely encompasses a whole host of goals in addition to acquiring employment with 
a firm. In their review of the job search literature, Boswell and colleagues (2012) noted a 
wide variety of reasons individuals might search for jobs including: gaining negotiation 
leverage, comparing employment to other opportunities, developing a professional 
network, staying aware of job alternatives, etc. Amongst this diversity, the common link 
between many of these objectives is the fact that they require some minimal level of 
belief on the part of the job applicant that he/she has a chance to receive a job offer. For 
example, searching for a job will only result in negotiation leverage if there is some, 
however small, chance that a job offer is tenable; employers will hardly be swayed by 
pipe dreams because unattainable jobs do not result in applicant power over the employer 
(Emerson, 1962). Likewise, job search as a means to compare opportunities and stay 
aware of job alternatives is not useful if the opportunities are not realistically achievable 
and the job in question does not provide a reasonably possible alternative to one’s current 
situation. In this way, a likely job offer serves as a foundational and necessary proxy for 
other practical and instrumental concerns of job applicants, ultimately resulting in hiring 
likelihood perceptions being one of the most fundamental driving forces of job applicant 
behavior. 
 Beyond simply securing employment, meta-analyses suggest that being attracted 
to an organization, or viewing the organization as a desirable place to work (Ehrhart & 
Ziegert, 2005; Rynes, 1991), is a salient goal and concern for job applicants during the 
entire recruiting process (Chapman et al., 2005; Uggerslev et al., 2012)—from as early as 
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the first recruitment message (Roberson, Collins, & Oreg, 2005) to the final stages of 
applicants’ eventual job choice (Chapman et al., 2005). Stated another way, job 
applicants not only want to find any job with any organization, but they also want to 
actually like the organization and the job they are applying for. From this perspective, job 
applicants are discerning and selective; they are sensitive to organizations’ behavior and, 
throughout the entire recruitment process (Uggerslev et al., 2012), are constantly trying to 
pick up on any type of signal or information that might indicate whether an organization 
is a desirable or undesirable place to work (Rynes, Bretz, & Gerhart, 1991).  
 To a certain extent, job applicants’ hiring likelihood and attraction goals could 
potentially conflict with each other. For example, meta-analyses (Uggerslev et al., 2012) 
find that a wide variety of individuals are attracted to certain desirable aspects of 
organizations, such as prestige and the availability of flextime and work-life balance 
(Chapman et al., 2005; Uggerslev et al., 2012). Given the wide appeal of particular 
organization characteristics and the limited number of jobs available at these desirable 
organizations, logic would dictate that the more attractive an organization is the more 
competition there would be for a position - ultimately decreasing the perceived likelihood 
each individual applicant holds for obtaining a job offer. Likewise, noncompensatory 
models of career decision making suggest that individuals require certain necessary, but 
not sufficient, attributes (e.g., location or job security) to be present for a job to even be 
considered a viable option (Highhouse & Hoffman, 2001). Given this decision making 
process, one easy way for applicants to meet their goal of obtaining employment and 
avoiding unemployment would be to enlarge their choice set of potential employers 
(Stevens, 1998b) by eliminating some “required” organization attributes. However, 
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applying to and considering an increasingly broader set of less-than-ideal organizations is 
a trade-off; job applicants increase the probability of receiving a job offer at the cost of 
reduced organization attraction. When considering these job applicant goals in isolation 
and separate from organization goals, one would expect an inherent conflict between job 
applicant attraction and hiring likelihood goals, resulting in a negative relationship 
between these two goals. Yet, meta-analyses find that hiring likelihood expectations and 
attraction are correlated at a ρ = .26 level (Chapman et al., 2005). This suggests that these 
job applicant goals have the potential to be reconciled. Social exchange theory provides 
some insight into this phenomenon by proposing that job applicant cognitions and 
attitudes are not formed in isolation from the organization but are likely dependent on the 
nature and extent of resource exchange with the hiring organization. In this way, a 
consideration of the relationship between job applicants and organizations, as well as 
their respective goals, may reveal that organizations’ actions can actually reconcile and 
simultaneously fulfill, at least in part, both job applicant goals. 
2.1.2 Organizational goals 
 Organization interest in personnel selection can be traced back to the birth of 
industrial and organizational psychology, with early applied scientists being concerned 
with developing means to determine “the best possible man” (Munsterberg, 1913: 25) for 
a job. Since then, the literature has flourished and resulted in the examination of a variety 
of selection techniques, from more traditional methods such as: personality tests (Ones, 
Dilchert, Viswesvaran, & Judge, 2007), situational judgment tests (McDaniel, Hartman, 
Whetzel, & Grubb, 2007), cognitive ability tests (Schmidt & Hunter, 2004), and 
employment interviews (McDaniel, Whetzel, Schmidt, & Maurer, 1994) to newer and 
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more technologically advanced social media screening techniques (Kluemper & Rosen, 
2009). Yet, the ultimate goal of all these selection techniques remains the same: 
differentiate the best candidates from the worst candidates and eliminate poor candidates 
from the hiring process.  
As a whole, extant research does support the validity of many selection 
procedures in the prediction of job performance (Hough & Oswald, 2000). In a meta-
analysis of 85 years of selection research covering 19 selection procedures, Schmidt and 
Hunter (1998) found that at least 17 different selection procedures provide unique 
incremental validity in predicting employee performance. Given the potential for high 
performers to disproportionately impact long-term organizational success (Aguinis & 
O’Boyle, 2014), it becomes clear why organizations have gone to great lengths to 
eliminate low potential candidates and narrow the pool of candidates to only those most 
likely to succeed. In light of research supporting the unique incremental validity of many 
different forms of selection procedures (Schmidt & Hunter, 1998), organizations might 
even be motivated to subject applicants to comprehensive batteries of these procedures to 
eliminate as many low potential candidates as possible. Yet, researchers have noted that 
organizations (and job applicants) often face limited resources and cannot feasibly 
administer (and participate in) all of these selection procedures (Terpstra & Rozell, 
1997). Adding to this difficulty are the adverse attitudes toward pre-employment testing 
that job applicants might have, with some estimates suggesting that more than a third of 
Americans have an unfavorable opinion toward such testing (Schmit & Ryan, 1997) and 
statistics showing that methods such as graphology, honesty tests, personal contacts, 
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biodata, and personality tests have a mean of less than three on five-point scales assessing 
favorability (Hausknecht et al., 2004). 
Compounding this complexity are historical changes in the employment 
landscape that have brought to light additional issues for organizations, forcing managers 
to consider not only issues of employee selection but also employee attraction as well. 
Whereas earlier research regarding employee selection occurred in a generally loose 
labor market (due to a growing number of first-time workers and increased female labor 
force participation), later research occurred in the context of predicted widespread labor 
shortages and thus attempted to address concerns surrounding the attraction of the 
dwindling number of potential job candidates (e.g., Rynes & Barber, 1990).  Indeed, this 
“war for talent” is still ongoing today and continued robust research streams seek to 
examine the process through which job applicants become attracted to organizations (for 
a recent meta-analysis see, Uggerslev et al., 2012).  
Compared to employee selection, which seeks to narrow the field of potential 
candidates and eliminate some candidates from consideration, employee attraction 
emphasizes enlarging a potential pool of candidates to get as many individuals as 
possible to: like the organization and job, pursue the job opening, accept the job offer, 
etc. (Chapman et al., 2005; Highhouse, Lievens, & Sinar, 2003). Thus, at first glance, 
employee attraction and selection concerns seem to be forcing organizations to choose 
between two distinct, and conflicting, goals.  
2.1.3 Potentially conflicting goals between organizations and job applicants 
 Adding to the complexity stemming from the potentially conflicting goals within 
job applicants and organizations are the frequently conflicting goals between job 
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applicants and organizations. Some scholars have recently noted that organizations and 
individuals in personnel selection situations often behave in an antagonistic fashion that 
is characteristic of opponents in game theory and competitors in evolutionary biology 
(Bangerter et al., 2012). Within this paradigm, applicants are naturally motivated to 
deceive organizations by inflating their qualifications and fit through actions such as 
buying a fake degree (Bear & Ezell, 2005), padding their resume (Kidwell, 2004), or 
simply lying (Weiss & Feldman, 2006). In response, organizations often take counter-
measures such as conducting reference and background checks (Levashina & Campion, 
2009) as well as integrity tests (Ones, Viswesvaran, & Schmidt, 1993). Similarly, 
organizations might be tempted to gain an upper-hand over job applicants by engaging in 
potentially privacy-breaching behaviors such as social media screening (Roth, Bobko, 
Van Iddekinge, & Thatcher, in press), to which job applicants might react by engaging in 
online impression management (Rosenberg & Egbert, 2011). Altogether this line of 
thinking positions organizations and job applicants as two parties in a game of one-
upmanship with inherently conflicting objectives driving both initial behaviors and 
reactions.  
2.2 Utilizing Social Exchange to Navigate the Potentially Conflicting Goals Within 
and Between Organizations and Job Applicants 
When considering the multitude of goals both within and between organizations, 
it begins to seem impossible for individuals to become employees in organizations at all. 
This feels especially challenging given the long-term stakes and consequences stemming 
from the staffing process. However, I suggest that upon closer examination, the goals 
both within and between organizations and job applicants are not necessarily at odds with 
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each other and, in fact, can be reconciled. To accomplish this I draw upon social 
exchange theory to provide insight into how organizations can balance the need to 
simultaneously fulfill applicant attraction and selection responsibilities all while meeting 
the multiple goals of job applicants.  
2.2.1 Social exchange theory 
Social exchanges are perhaps best understood via comparisons with economic 
exchanges. On the one hand, economic exchanges represent a short-term, strictly-
enumerated, and specified exchange where organizations offer some explicit inducement 
for an individual’s contribution (Tsui, Pearce, Porter, & Hite, 1995). In contrast, social 
exchanges are diffuse, long-term, and open-ended exchanges of benefits that occur 
between two parties (Blau, 1964) and are guided by norms of reciprocity (Gouldner, 
1960). In social exchanges, the provision of a benefit by party A to party B results in the 
non-explicit obligation for party B to provide a commensurate benefit back to party A 
(Blau, 1964). This reciprocity then cycles back and forth overtime resulting in the mutual 
long-term exchange of benefits between parties (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005). 
Compared to economic exchanges, which some scholars have likened to spot contracts, 
social exchanges have been conceptualized as mutual investments between individuals 
and organizations wherein both parties behave in ways that eventually benefit everyone, 
even at short term detriments to the self (Tsui, Pearce, Porter, & Tripoli, 1997). For 
example, Tsui and colleagues (1997: 1092-1093) note that in social exchanges employees 
are likely willing to decrease their marketability in the labor force by learning “firm-
specific skills that are not readily transferable to other employers because he or she trusts 
such investments will be reciprocated over the long term.” Likewise, healthy social 
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exchange relationships can shift an organization’s strategic emphasis from a strict focus 
on current levels of job performance to an extended consideration of employee well-
being and life satisfaction. For job applicants and hiring organizations who are mutually 
dependent on each other for scarce resources and limited in formal employment contracts 
under an at-will employment legal tradition (Schwoerer & Rosen, 1989), social exchange 
provides a conceptual framework where job applicants and hiring organizations can come 
to voluntarily cooperate to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes. While some hiring 
cycles may only last a few weeks, the multiple stages of recruitment (Barber, 1998) and 
selection (Gilliland & Hale, 2005) within all hiring cycles provide an ample opportunity 
for the multiple cycles of benefit provision and reciprocation that are a hallmark of social 
exchanges. More importantly, the possibility of a career with the hiring organization, 
regardless of recruiting cycle length, provides the potential long-term focus that is 
characteristic of social exchange. In sum, social exchange theory describes how different 
parties develop healthy exchange relationships that potentially work in the interest of 
both parties by meeting their respective needs and desires over time through the 
reciprocation of benefits. As a result, a social exchange perspective on recruiting and 
selection might provide insight into the conditions and processes through which the 
potentially conflicting goals of job applicants and organizations might be reconciled. 
A social exchange perspective on the relationship between job applicants and 
organizations offers several unique contributions and strengths. First, social exchange 
theory provides a complementary lens to “the theory most often used to explain 
recruitment phenomena—signaling theory” (Walker et al., 2012: 1326). Signaling theory 
suggests that job applicants attempt to scan the actions of an organization to ascertain the 
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characteristics and intentions of the organization in order to come to an understanding of 
how an individual might be treated by an organization once they are employees (Turban, 
2001; Walker et al., 2012). Social exchange theory supplements signaling theory by 
recognizing that the relationship between an organization and individual does not come 
into existence only once the individual becomes an employee of the organization, but is 
actually established as early as the first instance of contact between the two parties. 
Instead of being passive information absorbers that base job acceptance and attraction 
decisions on organizational characteristics and intentions, social exchange theory 
positions job candidates as active exchange partners that react to and reciprocate benefits 
given to them by organizations not only once they are employees but while they are still 
searching and applying for jobs. 
The depth of social exchange theory serves as a complement to broad theories of 
staffing (e.g., signaling theory), which have the ability to explain relationships between a 
large number of variables in a parsimonious manner (Ehrhart & Ziegert, 2005), by 
allowing for more specific predictions regarding the nature of applicant reactions to 
organizational actions. Of particular relevance is the resource theory of social exchange 
(U. G. Foa & Foa, 1974, 1980). In line with aforementioned distinctions between social 
and economic exchanges, Foa and Foa (1974, 1980) explicitly recognized that social 
exchanges need not only involve the exchange of monetary resources with strict 
economic value but also the exchange of resources with more symbolic, rather than 
material, value. In total, Foa and Foa (1974, 1980) identified six types of resources that 
could be exchanged: money, goods, service, love, status, and information. Money refers 
to any currency that has a standard unit of value; goods refer to tangible products; 
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services refer to labor and tasks accomplished by one party; love is the expression of 
warmth, affection, and comfort; status is a judgment of esteem and regard; and 
information includes opinions, enlightenment, and advice. In contrast to other resources 
(e.g., money, goods, service, and love), information is conceptualized as a more symbolic 
resource (i.e., one that is less concrete in benefit), which tends to be exchanged through 
verbal and paralinguistic behavior. Compared to services, goods, and money (which are 
likely not exchanged until a formal employer-employee relationship has been 
established), information is a highly salient resource for both job applicants and hiring 
organizations during the recruiting process and thus the nature of the information 
exchange between these two parties likely affects social exchange relationship quality. 
Another major tenet of the resource theory of social exchange is the concept of 
reciprocation in kind (E. B. Foa & Foa, 2012). Reciprocation in kind refers to the 
tendency for individuals to reciprocate the receipt of one resource with the same resource. 
Compared to broader theories, the elucidation of the notion of in-kind exchanges allows 
for more precise prediction regarding the nature and form of reciprocation that 
organizations will likely receive when they offer information-related benefits to job 
applicants. For example, when a job applicant receives information-based benefits from 
the hiring organization, the resource theory of social exchange predicts that the job 
applicant will not only reciprocate with some benefit in return but that the form of this 
reciprocal benefit will usually be information-based (i.e., information itself or related to 
information). 
Finally, social exchange theory recognizes that most relationships involve not 
only benefits but costs as well. Costs are any type of activity that has negative value to a 
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party (Homans, 1961), be it negative elements imposed on the focal party by the other 
party, as in the case of punishments (Donnenwerth & Foa, 1974), or social resources that 
must be given up in order to supply a benefit to the other party (Blau, 1964), such as 
opportunity costs. The viability of social exchange relationships are predicated on both 
parties perceiving that the expected benefits of engaging in an exchange relationship with 
the other party is commensurate with the expected costs (Emerson, 1976). This 
perception is primarily conceptualized as the ratio of benefits to costs associated with a 
particular exchange partner (Adams, 1965). To the extent that each party’s ratio of 
benefits to costs is greater than one they will view the other party as a “good” social 
exchange partner and continue to engage in a social exchange relationship. If the reverse 
case is true and the costs of a relationship are expected to continually exceed the benefits, 
then there will likely be some form of corrective action, such as a decrease in the benefits 
reciprocated, retaliation or punishment against the other party, or simply the 
extinguishment of the social exchange relationship (Molm, 1994). 
2.2.2 Felt obligation as a social exchange-based job applicant goal 
 In a general sense, a job applicant likely wants to work for an organization with 
which they will have a healthy exchange of resources. While the applicant attraction 
literature, which based on meta-analyses, finds that job applicants are generally attracted 
to (i.e., desire) certain organizational characteristics such as prestige and the availability 
of flextime and work-life balance (Chapman et al., 2005; Uggerslev et al., 2012), social 
exchange theory suggests that more relationship-oriented concerns might be just as 
salient to job seekers. In particular, I posit that applicants appreciate working for an 
organization they have a felt obligation toward. Although it is somewhat counter-intuitive 
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to suggest that individuals appreciate being obligated toward another party, a closer look 
at the definition of felt obligation suggests that felt obligation is the basis of a positive 
exchange relationship between parties. In particular, felt obligation captures “the belief 
regarding whether one should care about the organization’s well-being and should help 
the organization reach its goals (Eisenberger et al., 2001: 42).” Because of this, some 
scholars have noted that felt obligation, due to the norm of reciprocity, serves as a 
“starting mechanism” for healthy social exchange relationships (Aselage & Eisenberger, 
2003: 492). In this way, job applicants might evaluate organizations with which they 
have a felt obligation toward more favorably because caring about the organization’s 
well-being and goals serves to increase the “win-win” mentality conducive to social 
exchange relationships and likely indicates the potentially positive future exchange 
relationship that a job applicant might have with an organization. In this way, felt 
obligation toward an organization is a relationship-oriented construct that captures 
applicants’ desire to have a relationship with an origination that is characterized by 
reciprocity (Blau, 1964).  
2.2.3 Hiring likelihood as a social exchange-based job applicant goal 
 As stated throughout this paper, a primary goal of job applicants is to get a job 
offer and secure employment. In fact, a logical extension of the social exchange literature 
to recruiting and selection would suggest that the perception that one has the chance of 
receiving a job offer is actually an implicit requirement for the development of social 
exchanges; without some level of hiring likelihood perceptions, job applicants will not 
believe that a longer-term relationship with the firm (e.g., being an employee) is possible 
which would reduce the likelihood of future reciprocal benefits from the organization. In 
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turn, the job applicant will not behave with a long-term mindset and instead engage in 
spot transactions that maximize short-term benefits as well as hold other attitudes, such as 
low commitment (van Knippenberg & Sleebos, 2006), that are more typical of economic 
exchanges (Tsui et al., 1997). This dissertation supplements current conceptualizations of 
hiring likelihood estimates with a social exchange perspective to suggest that hiring 
likelihood perceptions themselves are made according to the dynamics of benefits and 
costs as outlined in social exchange theory. Altogether, hiring likelihood perceptions are 
an important indicator of social exchange relationship potential that represents the 
likelihood of achieving one of the primary goals of job applicants – securing 
employment. 
There are reasons to believe that appraisals of hiring likelihood follow the basic 
dynamics of benefit and cost analysis that are an integral part of social exchange theory. 
Scholars have previously stated that “because job seekers are frequently uncertain about 
their marketability, they have been hypothesized to grasp at any available information 
that might help them estimate their chances of receiving offers” (Rynes, 1989: 134). In 
line with this assertion, researchers have found that job applicants often consider both the 
positive experiences provided by organizations during the recruiting process, such as 
interacting with a friendly (Chapman & Webster, 2006) and personable (Harris & Fink, 
1987) recruiter with positive affect (Rynes & Miller, 1983), as well as the negative 
experiences, such as an intimidating recruiter (Turban & Dougherty, 1992), when 
estimating their perceived hiring likelihood. I suggest that these perceptions of positive 
and negative experiences can be conceptualized as the provision of benefits and the 
imposition of relational costs by organizations, respectively. In this way, hiring likelihood 
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perceptions operate as an assessment of social exchange relationship quality and viability 
from the job applicant’s perspective. By comparing the relative balance of positive 
benefits provided by the organization to the negative costs, job applicants can assess the 
current social exchange relationship with a potential employer; an employer that provides 
more benefits than costs creates a high quality exchange relationship that can be expected 
to last long into the future. 
2.2.4 Recruitment and selection as information exchange 
Information represents a particularly valuable resource for both hiring 
organizations and job applicants within the context of employee recruitment and 
selection. Models of the recruitment process position information exchange as the first 
step in recruiting (Breaugh, 1992; Breaugh & Starke, 2000), suggesting that social 
exchange dynamics are relevant throughout the entire recruiting process. For most job 
applicants, this first step is represented by the job posting where organizations disclose 
information about the nature of the organization (e.g., mission statement), describe the 
job, and set relevant deadlines. However, any exchange of advice, opinions, instruction, 
or enlightenment (U. G. Foa & Foa, 1974, 1980), whether disclosed or sought out by the 
organization, can be considered a social exchange that is relevant to the relationship 
between job applicants and hiring organizations.  
The conceptualization of recruiting and selection activities as information-based 
phenomena is a theme throughout much of their respective literatures. For example, 
scholars have acknowledged that “the selection process is a two-way interaction where 
applicants and organizations gather information about one another and react to this 
information while making employment decisions” (Bauer, Maertz, Dolen, & Campion, 
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1998: 892). Furthermore, scholars have noted that “during the interview, a myriad of 
pieces of applicant information are received, interpreted, and evaluated by the interviewer 
in an attempt to “score” the applicant and ultimately make an accept-or-reject decision” 
(Barrick, Shaffer, & DeGrassi, 2009: 1395). Finally, job search itself has been defined as 
“the process of gathering information about potential jobs” (Barber, Daly, Giannantonio, 
& Phillips, 1994: 739). In accordance with social exchange theory, information represents 
a valued resource with symbolic but no less important implications and, as a result, the 
robust reciprocal exchange of information between job applicants and hiring 
organizations should lead to high quality relationships.  
However, selection and recruitment activities are also high-stakes, somewhat 
contrived, social exchanges between strangers which tend to elicit impression 
management and self-presentation concerns in both job applicants (Barrick et al., 2009) 
and organizations (Avery & McKay, 2006). While perhaps harming the social exchange 
quality between the job applicant and the organization, meta-analytical evidence suggests 
that individuals are often quite justified in their desire to engage in impression 
management since organizations often times place too much emphasis on irrelevant 
criteria when they evaluate job applicants (Barrick et al., 2009). Given these pressures, 
job applicants and recruiters could be tempted to withhold or manipulate information, 
which creates a situation that might ultimately leave these two parties thinking, “What I 
saw is not what I got.”  
2.3 Model Summary 
With the war for talent raging on and the increased importance of attracting high 
quality candidates for competitive advantages (Coff & Kryscynski, 2011), it is incumbent 
25 
on organizations to resolve the above dilemmas. This is especially true since 
organizations, compared to job applicants, likely have more direct discretion to affect the 
nature and structure of the recruiting and selection processes. For these reasons, the 
theoretical model in Figure 1 begins with organizations’ information-related actions and 
focuses on the way organizations might resolve the above tensions by simultaneously 
balancing attractive selection activities (i.e., positive diagnostic information seeking) with 
necessary, but perhaps off-putting, selection activities (i.e., negative diagnostic 
information seeking) to develop healthy social exchange relationships with job 
applicants. The most proximal result of these activities will be the fulfillment of the two 
aforementioned social exchange-based goals, hiring likelihood perceptions and felt 
obligation. The former likely acts as an important contingency factor in the development 
of social exchange relationships while the latter should drive reciprocation in the form of 
information-based benefits, such as: the establishment of self-imposed decision deadlines 
and the minimization of these deadlines, more positive word of mouth, less negative 
word of mouth, and less applicant faking. 
At this point, it is important to make explicit some of the implicit assumptions and 
logic underlying the theoretical model. Due to the fact that social exchange theory 
addresses the exchange of resources with symbolic (and often times objectively 
incalculable) value, the social exchange literature does suggest that it is the subjective 
perception and weighing of the other party’s behavior and provided benefits, and not 
necessarily the actual behavior and benefits, that most accurately predict the nature and 
extent of reciprocation—for it is only in the eye of the beholder that value and benefit 
from a symbolic resource can adequately be judged (Emerson, 1976). As evidence of this 
26 
theoretical perspective, the most popular scale utilized in social exchange (Colquitt, Baer, 
Long, & Halvorsen-Ganepola, 2014), perceived organizational support, asks employees 
their perceptions of whether organizations seem to help them, care about their well-being, 
value their contributions, and consider their goals and values (Eisenberger, Armeli, 
Rexwinkel, Lynch, & Rhoades, 2001). Applied to the present study, the social exchange 
literature’s overall emphasis on perceptions means that it is likely the case that 
perceptions of organizations’ information-related actions are just as important as 
organizations’ actual behavior in predicting job applicants’ reciprocal behavior. At the 
same time, it is likely that the actual information-related behaviors that organizations 
engage in during the recruiting process are the most proximal predictors of the 
perceptions that job applicants are likely to form regarding these behaviors. Therefore, I 
expect the model and hypotheses outlined below to apply to both perceptions of 
organizations’ information-related behavior as well as organizations’ actual information-
related behavior. For the sake of parsimony, the theory and hypothesis development 
below is couched from the perspective of actual organizational behaviors. While it is out 
of the scope of this paper to examine the ways or conditions in which job applicant’s 
perceptions might be “wrong” and diverge from the actual behavior of organizations, I 
will nonetheless test the theoretical model based on both perceptions of behaviors 
(through a field study) and actual behaviors (as manipulations in an experimental design). 
By examining actual behaviors, the results will hopefully be more relevant to 
organizations by providing practical and actionable ways for organizations to develop 
healthy social exchange relationships with job applicants. Altogether, this paper 
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theoretically and empirically examines both the perceptions associated with and 








3.1 The Role of Organizations’ Information Seeking in Meeting Organizational 
Goals 
 Of the 19 most popular selection methods identified by Schmidt and Hunter 
(1998) in their meta-analysis (e.g., GMA tests, interviews, job knowledge tests, peer 
ratings, etc.), almost all rely on some type of information about the job candidate. 
Moreover, a study by Macan & Dipboye (1990) found that interviewers spent 36% of the 
interview time gathering information from the job applicant. These facts should come as 
no surprise given that the selection of one job candidate over another should ideally be 
based on some information that differentiates and identifies a candidate as being superior, 
or inferior, to the rest of the pool of job candidates. This idea is best captured by the 
concept of diagnosticity, which is defined as “the extent to which a given piece of 
information discriminates between alternative hypotheses, interpretations, or 
categorizations” (Herr et al., 1991: 457). While the ultimate categorization task for hiring 
organizations is whether or not a job applicant should be given a job offer, organizations 
make numerous smaller categorization decisions through the multiple stages of the 
selection process (Gilliland & Hale, 2005). To accomplish this, organizations often times 
seek out diagnostic information about a job applicant through various selection methods 
(e.g, biodata, interview questioning, letters of recommendation, etc.). Drawing from 
extant research (Sackett, 1982), I suggest that the diagnosticity of information can stem 
from its revelation of positive or negative aspects of a job applicant. For example, 
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organizations might seek information regarding the awards or honors that an applicant 
has earned. The diagnosticity of this information lies in its ability to identify those with 
more awards (i.e., more positive information) and those with less awards (i.e., less 
positive information). On the other hand, organizations also conduct criminal background 
checks. In this case, the diagnosticity of this information lies in its ability to identify 
those with more extensive criminal histories (i.e., more negative information) and those 
with less extensive criminal histories (i.e., less negative information). I argue that 
distinguishing between: (1) organizational actions that are aimed at gathering information 
that discriminates between candidates that should get a job offer and those that should not 
get a job offer based on positive aspects of a job applicant (what I refer to as positive 
diagnostic information seeking) versus (2) organizational actions that are aimed at 
gathering information that discriminates between candidates that should get a job offer 
and those that should not get a job offer based on negative aspects of a job applicant (i.e., 
negative diagnostic information seeking) is important because job candidates are likely to 
react differently to these two information seeking strategies. Based on social exchange 
theory, it is probable that job applicants see positive diagnostic information seeking as a 
social exchange benefit while negative diagnostic information seeking is likely seen by 
job applicants as a social exchange cost. 
Positive diagnostic information seeking captures those selection behaviors that are 
intended to produce information that is useful to organizational decision making because 
it differentiates candidates based on positive job applicant information (Sackett, 1982). A 
related meta-construct is the idea of “selecting in” job candidates (e.g., Bartram, 2000), 
where a selection tool focuses on finding information that distinguishes a particularly 
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good candidate from amongst the applicant pool. Given the focus on positive 
information, these organizational behaviors are opportunities for candidates to present 
favorable images of themselves to organizations (Barrick et al., 2009; Kristof-Brown, 
Barrick, & Franke, 2002) and, as organizations collect more of this favorable 
information, the job applicant begins to look more well-suited to be a future employee. In 
this way, positive diagnostic information seeking can fulfill one of the core goals of 
organizations during the hiring process (i.e., applicant attraction), as meta-analyses have 
shown that giving job applicants the opportunity to perform and show their competency 
is positively related to applicant attraction (Chapman et al., 2005). At the same time, 
these behaviors also help address organizations’ selection concerns by identifying 
promising employees which is a primary goal of organizations during the staffing 
process.  
 On the other hand, negative diagnostic information seeking represents 
organizational selection behaviors that are intended to produce information that is useful 
to organizational decision making because it differentiates candidates based on negative 
information about the job applicants (Sackett, 1982). In contrast to positive diagnostic 
information seeking, negative diagnostic information seeking behaviors can be described 
as “selecting out” job applicants (e.g., Bartram, 2000) and are designed to identify and 
remove particularly poor candidates from the job applicant pool. Well-established 
selection practices, such as drug testing (Normand, Salyards, & Mahoney, 1990) and 
integrity assessments (J. W. Jones, 1991), and newer methods such as the examination of 
social media profiles (Roth et al., in press) are mostly used to gather negative information 
about a candidate to assess and screen out applicants with abnormalities and flaws rather 
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than ascertain applicant strengths. Within the interview context, Sackett (1982) has found 
that certain questions, such as “tell me about any conflicts you have had with co-workers 
on any of your previous jobs” and “what would others see as your weaknesses,” are 
perceived by observers as intending to seek out potentially negative information about a 
job candidate. Indeed, interviews can often be seen as having a selection focus which is 
characterized, in part, by questions that are more likely to lead to candidate 
disqualification (Rynes, 1989). In this way, negative diagnostic information seeking 
behaviors likely work in the opposite direction of positive diagnostic information seeking 
behaviors by selecting worse candidates for removal from further consideration.  
While positive or negative information about an individual need not be diagnostic, 
diagnostic information should have an associated positive or negative valence as 
completely neutral information would not have any implications for hiring decisions. At 
the same time, it is important to note that positive and negative diagnostic information 
seeking behavior captures organizations’ intentions and not the actual information that is 
generated as this information depends, in part, on applicants’ responses (Morrison, 1993). 
For example, applicants may avoid a question or change the subject in response to either 
positive or negative diagnostic information seeking. In line with social exchange theory, 
the important aspect of information seeking behaviors are the symbolic implications of 
seeking positive or negative diagnostic information. In particular, I posit that positive and 
negative diagnostic information seeking by organizations during the hiring process are 
likely a form of social exchange benefit and cost, respectively. While Foa and Foa’s 
(2012; 1974, 1980) resource theory of social exchange outlines advice, opinions, or 
enlightenment as prototypical examples of information resources, the consideration of 
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Homans’ (1961: 13) broad definition of social exchange “as an exchange of activity, 
tangible or intangible, and more or less rewarding or costly, between at least two 
persons” suggests that information-related activities, such as information seeking 
behaviors, can be conceptualized as a form of information reward (or cost) within social 
exchange relationships. In line with Homans’ (1961) definition, I outline below how 
positive diagnostic information seeking behaviors by organizations likely act as an 
information resource offered by organizations because they represent an intangible 
activity that is rewarding to job applicants while negative diagnostic information seeking 
behaviors by organizations are likely an intangible activity that is costly to job applicants.  
3.2 The Role of Organizations’ Information Seeking in Meeting Job Applicant Goals 
For the job applicant, positive diagnostic information seeking is beneficial 
because it allows the job applicant the chance to distinguish themselves as a superior 
candidate and is an important component of being seriously considered by an 
organization. While technically possible, one would be hard pressed to find an employee 
who received his/her job by merely providing less negative information than other 
candidates to their employer during the selection process. From this perspective, an 
organization’s positive diagnostic information seeking behaviors are likely to be viewed 
as opportunities to perform, which are defined as the extent to which selection procedures 
allow a job applicant the chance to demonstrate their knowledge, skills, and abilities 
(Gilliland, 1993). Based on this, I argue that positive diagnostic information seeking 
likely impacts the conclusions applicants draw about their obligation toward the 
organization and their perceived chances of receiving a job offer with the organization. 
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Scholars have noted that opportunity to perform is the selection-context analogy 
of the organizational justice concept of voice (Gilliland, 1993), which captures the extent 
to which employees are given the opportunity to express themselves prior to a decision 
(Greenberg & Folger, 1983). Like voice (van den Bos, Lind, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1997), 
extant work supports the notion that these opportunities to perform are highly valuable to 
job candidates, above and beyond whether applicants ultimately do or do not get the job 
(Schleicher, Venkataramani, Morgeson, & Campion, 2006). In this way, positive 
diagnostic information seeking behaviors are, in part, symbolic resources that are valued 
because they represent the conveyance of benefits such as status and respect (Tyler, 1989; 
Tyler & Blader, 2003) which can be important for the development of social exchange 
relationships (E. B. Foa & Foa, 2012; U. G. Foa & Foa, 1974, 1980). As with voice, it is 
also possible that job applicants hold the belief that sufficient opportunities to present 
positive information about themselves to organizations is even a moral imperative and 
something organizations just ought to do (Cropanzano, Byrne, Bobocel, & Rupp, 2001). 
Organizational adherence to this moral mandate can lead job applicants to develop the 
trust that is crucial to social exchange relationships (Blau, 1964; Lind, 2001). 
  In general, job applicant felt obligation is based on the provision of benefits and 
resources to the focal party by the other party (Eisenberger et al., 2001). All else equal, 
the provision of benefits by the organization to job applicants should result in an increase 
in felt obligation toward the organization. This dynamic is in line with the original 
elucidation of social exchange theory that is based in large part on the norm of reciprocity 
(Gouldner, 1960) which suggests that social benefits (or costs) provided by party A 
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increases (or decreases) a sense of obligation in party B to return resources back to party 
A (Eisenberg et al., 2001).  
Hypothesis 1: Positive diagnostic information seeking is positively related to job 
applicants’ felt obligation toward the organization. 
Besides the symbolic benefit of being allowed to present their knowledge, skills, 
and abilities, positive diagnostic information seeking likely simultaneously carries 
instrumental importance to job candidates by increasing their chances of being given a 
job. In particular, an organization’s positive diagnostic information seeking gives job 
candidates the chance to directly differentiate themselves from the rest of the pack via 
positive information about themselves; in fact, some scholars have even suggested that 
these opportunities are a requirement for performing well on a task (Ford, Quiñones, 
Sego, & Sorra, 1992). In this way, positive diagnostic information seeking by 
organizations likely serves an instrumental purpose in shaping applicant success and, 
consequently, hiring likelihood perceptions during the selection process. By way of 
logical deduction, it is likely that positive diagnostic information seeking can also be 
considered a benefit or resource offered in a social exchange relationship. To the extent 
that organizations provide this benefit, job applicants likely perceive that organizations 
are more invested in the relationship and thus job applicants should view a longer-term 
relationship with the organization as more likely because it allows the opportunity for 
organizations to benefit from future applicant reciprocation (Blau, 1964). 
Beyond this, positive diagnostic information seeking likely provides the 
additional benefit of allowing candidates to fulfill their need for self-enhancement, or the 
need to view oneself favorably (Banaji & Prentice, 1994; Pratt, 1998; Sedikides & 
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Strube, 1997), during an important transition period between roles (Ashforth, 2001). In 
addition to initiating a healthy social exchange relationship, self-enhancement has also 
been shown to increase subsequent self-esteem (E. E. Jones, Rhodewalt, Berglas, & 
Skelton, 1981) which is directly relevant to an individual’s hiring likelihood perceptions 
(Bandura, 1977, 1986; Vroom, 1964). As a result, when organizations give job applicants 
more opportunities to provide favorable information about themselves via positive 
diagnostic information seeking, job applicants should hold higher levels of hiring 
likelihood perceptions. 
Hypothesis 2: Positive diagnostic information seeking by the hiring organization 
is positively related to job applicants’ perceptions of hiring likelihood. 
In contrast, negative diagnostic information seeking is likely to be seen as a cost 
within a social exchange relationship and, as a result, should decrease job applicants’ felt 
obligation toward the organization. In a broad sense, job applicants likely react to 
negative diagnostic information seeking in a generally adverse way (Rosse, Miller, & 
Stecher, 1994). This could be due, in part, to the fact that negative diagnostic information 
seeking likely provokes privacy concerns, which some scholars have defined as the 
ability, or lack thereof, for individuals to manage or control information about themselves 
and the subsequent impressions that others form of them (Stone & Stone, 1990). This is 
an especially salient issue for job applicants given the fact that they are constantly trying 
to manage the impressions that organizations have of them during the recruiting and 
selection process (Stevens & Kristof, 1995). To make matters worse, this is made even 
more difficult by negative diagnostic information seeking since it is most useful to 
organizations for selecting-out candidates when there is something worse than average 
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that is revealed about the candidate. For example, negative diagnostic information 
seeking might result in the revelation of socially undesirable behaviors such as dishonesty 
(J. W. Jones, 1991) or a poor credit score (Bernerth, Taylor, Walker, & Whitman, 2012; 
Kuhn & Nielsen, 2008). An empirical study by Stone-Romero, Stone, and Hyatt (2003) 
seems to support this link by showing a positive correlation between the invasiveness of a 
selection method and the potential for a selection method to reveal negative information 
about a candidate. From a social exchange perspective, it seems that negative diagnostic 
information seeking is likely to be considered an information-based cost associated with 
interacting and having a relationship with an organization that engages in this type of 
selection behavior. As a result, job applicants should feel lower levels of obligation 
toward the hiring organization. 
Hypothesis 3: Negative diagnostic information seeking by the hiring organization 
is negatively related to job applicants’ felt obligation toward the organization. 
Similarly, the seeking of negative information might “turn off” job applicants 
(Schmit & Ryan, 1997) and cause them to believe that the organization would not be 
interested in a long-term social exchange relationship with them (i.e., decreasing 
estimates of the likelihood of a job offer). To be more precise, the seeking out of negative 
information about a job candidate likely elicits feelings of threat concerning one’s 
competency (Swann, Pelham, & Krull, 1989), which is associated with stress and anxiety 
(Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981). Due to these unpleasant situations, negative 
information seeking places a relational cost on job applicants (and not organizations) 
which can be interpreted by the job applicant to mean that the organization can sever 
their relationship at any time without losing anything. Social exchange theory also 
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suggests that it is the exchange of benefits, and not the imposition of relational costs, that 
initiates healthy social exchange relationships (Blau, 1964). Therefore, the levying of 
these relational costs, all else equal, suggests to the job applicant that the organization is 
not really interested in a longer term exchange of resources (Blau, 1964). Furthermore, 
threat decreases the probability of agreement in negotiations (Hornstein, 1965) which 
may cause the job applicant to believe that a continuing healthy social exchange 
relationship is not possible as negotiations can be an important and necessary step during 
recruiting and selection (e.g., salary negotiations; Gerhart & Rynes, 1991). Finally, the 
recollection of negative information about themselves is likely to affect candidates’ 
perceptions of success given that past failures have been predictive of individuals’ future 
expectation of failure (Feather, 1966).  
Hypothesis 4: Negative diagnostic information seeking by the hiring organization 
is negatively related to job applicants’ perceptions of hiring likelihood. 
Recall that social exchanges are characterized by a long-term exchange of 
resources over time (Tsui et al., 1995). Thus, a condition for the development of social 
exchanges is the possibility that a relationship can extend into the future. For job 
applicants, this is best represented by perceptions of hiring likelihood which likely act as 
an important contingency factor in predicting their felt obligation toward the 
organization. In this way, social exchange benefits and costs (i.e., positive and negative 
diagnostic information seeking) are less likely to have an impact on job applicant’s felt 
obligation to reciprocate when applicants perceive a low probability of being hired by the 
organization. Under conditions of low hiring likelihood, job applicants are likely to 
construe their interactions with hiring organizations as economic, rather than social, 
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exchanges, and thus are less likely to develop any feelings of obligation toward the 
organization in response to social exchange benefits and costs, such as positive and 
negative diagnostic information seeking. 
Hypothesis 5a: Job applicants’ perceptions of hiring likelihood moderate the 
positive relationship between positive diagnostic information seeking and felt obligation 
toward the organization; such that, greater hiring likelihood weakens the positive 
relationship. 
Hypothesis 5b: Job applicants’ perceptions of hiring likelihood moderate the 
negative relationship between negative diagnostic information seeking and felt obligation 
toward the organization; such that, greater hiring likelihood weakens the negative 
relationship. 
3.3 Applicant Reciprocation Outcomes 
 As mentioned, the basic premise of social exchange theory is that the receipt of 
benefits by the focal party from another party leads the focal party to reciprocate a benefit 
back to the other party (Blau, 1964). Therefore, any paper would be amiss if these 
reciprocating benefits were not examined. However, benefits can be defined quite 
broadly (e.g., Homans, 1961) and so the possibility exists that job applicants can 
exchange an innumerable variety of resources as reciprocation. To this end, the resource 
theory of social exchange (E. B. Foa & Foa, 2012; U. G. Foa & Foa, 1974, 1980) 
provides needed specificity by suggesting that information benefits will be reciprocated 
with information benefits. More precisely, I predict that higher levels of felt obligation 
will result in: the establishment and minimization of self-imposed decision deadlines, 
more positive word of mouth, less negative word of mouth, and less applicant faking.  
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3.3.1 Self-imposed decision deadlines 
 For organizations with the goal of attracting and selecting the best candidates, 
time is often of the essence. One need only consider the popularity of exploding offers 
(e.g., Robinson, 1995) to see that timely information regarding an applicant’s intentions 
serves a vital purpose in managing the logistics and costs associated with recruiting 
(Sterling, 2014) and is thus a valuable resource for organizations participating in the labor 
market (Niederle & Roth, 2009). However, after receipt of a job offer, applicants might 
delay their decision-making due to their preoccupation with other job search efforts or 
because they are awaiting an alternative job offer from another company (W. J. Becker, 
Connolly, & Slaughter, 2010). Interestingly, interviews conducted by Boswell and 
colleagues (Boswell, Roehling, LePine, & Moynihan, 2003) found that a large portion 
(about 30%) of job applicants actually voluntarily self-imposed deadlines for their job 
offer decision. In contrast to exploding offers, which are organization-imposed deadlines 
for deciding on a job offer (Robinson, 1995), self-imposed decision deadlines are 
voluntarily set by job applicants themselves and reflect the extent to which job applicants 
desire to make a prompt decision on their job offer (Ariely & Wertenbroch, 2002; W. J. 
Becker et al., 2010). While typically studied in the context of self-regulation (e.g., Ariely 
& Wertenbroch, 2002), I suggest that self-imposed decision deadlines represent one way 
in which job applicants might reciprocate information benefits to hiring organizations.  
First, a desire to reciprocate informational benefits back to the organization due to 
felt obligation likely provides the impetus necessary for the self-regulation associated 
with the establishment of self-imposed decision deadlines (Ariely & Wertenbroch, 2002). 
As opposed to simply responding whenever convenient, at the last minute, as soon as 
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possible, or never, self-imposed decision deadlines represent a conscious intention to act, 
which can be used by job applicants to benefit the organization. Similarly, the social 
exchange forces described thus far could also drive the applicant to minimize the length 
of time for the self-imposed decision deadlines that they do make. As opposed to 
“stringing along” organizations, shorter self-imposed decision deadlines are likely an 
additional way in which job applicants might provide hiring organizations with useful 
information regarding what they intend to do with a potential job offer (W. J. Becker et 
al., 2010). Given folk beliefs regarding the norm of reciprocation (Gouldner, 1960), even 
job applicants that eventually do not accept a job offer can potentially set self-imposed 
decision deadlines as a form of reciprocation. Furthermore, research suggests that 
individuals appreciate the provision of timely communications regarding decisions 
(Shapiro, Buttner, & Barry, 1994) which means that job applicants likely recognize the 
potential benefits to organizations of setting and minimizing the length of time associated 
with self-imposed decision deadlines. Together with the resource theory of social 
exchange (E. B. Foa & Foa, 2012; U. G. Foa & Foa, 1974, 1980), job applicants’ felt 
obligation toward the organization should result in job applicants being more likely to: 
(1) set self-imposed decision deadlines and (2) set shorter self-imposed decision 
deadlines.  
Hypothesis 6a: Job applicants’ felt obligation toward the organization is 
positively related to the establishment of self-imposed decision deadlines. 
Hypothesis 6b: Job applicants’ felt obligation toward the organization is 
negatively related to the length of self-imposed decision deadlines. 
3.3.2 Word of mouth 
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 While benefits reciprocated by job applicants can be provided directly to the 
hiring organization, social exchange theory takes a rather broad definition of benefits 
with Homans (1961: 13) defining it as any “activity, tangible or intangible, that is more 
or less rewarding…” and Blau (1984) describing benefits as rewarding services or gifts. 
From this perspective, the defining feature of reciprocating benefits is that they provide 
some type of reward to the social exchange partner. Based on this, reciprocation by job 
applicants to hiring organizations need not necessarily involve the hiring organization at 
all but merely, in some manner, involve benefit to the organization. One possible way 
this might occur in the present context is the phenomenon of word of mouth (e.g., Van 
Hoye & Lievens, 2007), which is defined as an “interpersonal communication, 
independent of the organization’s marketing activities, about an organization or its 
products” (Van Hoye & Lievens, 2009: 342). It is important to note that word of mouth is 
company independent information about the organization and, while not typically thought 
of as a social exchange benefit, is an important activity that does have the potential to 
have a large impact on the success or failure of recruiting efforts primarily because it is 
not seen as being driven by self-interest (Van Hoye & Lievens, 2009). In terms of 
potential reciprocation, job applicants can spread either positive or negative word of 
mouth, which are two theoretically (Harrison-Walker, 2001) and empirically distinct (De 
Matos & Rossi, 2008) constructs. In relation to the organization, maximizing positive 
word of mouth while minimize negative word of mouth likely represent increased social 
exchange benefits and decreased social exchange costs, respectively. 
 Interestingly, word of mouth represents a unique means by which job applicants 
might reciprocate benefits back to the hiring organization in the sense that word of mouth 
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does not disadvantage applicants in the recruiting and selection process. In reaction to 
higher levels of felt obligation, applicants can provide recommendations to friends or 
acquaintances without sacrificing any strategic advantage such as time to respond to a job 
offer (i.e., self-imposed decision deadlines) or the possibility of faking. Similarly, 
negative word of mouth is also a potential reaction to low levels of felt obligation and a 
means by which applicants may harm an organization while minimizing their chances of 
being caught or punished. Altogether, word of mouth represents a particularly viable 
means through which applicants might reciprocate benefits (or costs) back to a hiring 
organization. 
Hypothesis 7a: Job applicants’ felt obligation toward the organization is 
positively related to positive word of mouth. 
Hypothesis 7b: Job applicants’ felt obligation toward the organization is 
negatively related to negative word of mouth. 
3.3.3 Faking 
 One large concern for organizations as they navigate the selection process is 
applicant faking. In contrast to impression management, which may not necessarily be 
deceptive, faking is defined as the conscious distortion of information in an attempt to 
obtain a better score on selection instruments and/or otherwise create favorable 
perceptions (Levashina & Campion, 2007). This represents a potential area of conflicting 
goals between job applicants and hiring organizations. On one hand, applicants may 
desire to distort information to gain an advantage in the selection process or simply be 
viewed in a socially desirable way (Levashina & Campion, 2007). On the other hand, the 
efficacy of organizational selection tools such as: biodata (T. E. Becker & Colquitt, 
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1992), personality measures (Birkeland, Manson, Kisamore, Brannick, & Smith, 2006), 
and interviews (Levashina & Campion, 2007), depend on accurate information provided 
by applicants. Based on this, decreased amounts of faking represent one valuable 
information resource that job applicants can potentially reciprocate to organizations as a 
result of a positive social exchange relationship. It is important to note that faking is a 
conscious process that involves intentional moral violations (Marcus, 2009) and as a 
result, applicants likely have the ability to control the levels of faking with respect to 
some organizations versus other organizations. Furthermore, faking behavior requires 
sufficient motivation on the part of the job applicant (Snell, Sydell, & Lueke, 1999) 
which I argue is predominantly captured by the levels of felt obligation a job applicant 
has toward the organization. Given that felt obligation is centered on a job applicant’s 
level of care toward the organization’s goals (Eisenberger et al., 2001), the conscious 
distortion of information in selection scenarios (i.e., faking), which necessarily 
undermines the organization’s goal of effective selection, is incompatible with a felt 
obligation toward the organization. Thus,  
Hypothesis 8: Job applicants’ felt obligation toward the organization is 
negatively related to applicant faking. 
3.4 Moderated Mediation 
Overall, the social exchange-based model outlined in Figure 1 suggests that 
organizations’ information-based actions can indirectly affect benefits and costs returned 
to the organization from the applicant through the social exchange mechanism of felt 
obligation. At the same time, the development of a social exchange relationship, and thus 
the reciprocation of resources from the job applicant back to the hiring organization, is 
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contingent on applicants’ perceptions of hiring likelihood. In other words, social 
exchange dynamics and the mechanism of these exchanges (i.e., felt obligation) are 
suppressed under conditions of low perceived hiring likelihood and organizations’ efforts 
to manage levels of felt obligation by way of different information seeking strategies (i.e., 
positive and negative diagnostic information seeking) may be less effective under such 
circumstances. Empirically, this is represented by a first-stage moderated mediation 
model (Hayes, 2013).  
Hypothesis 9a-e: Job applicants’ felt obligation toward the organization mediates 
the relationship between positive diagnostic information seeking and (a) the 
establishment and (b) length of self-imposed decision deadlines, (c) positive word of 
mouth, (d) negative word of mouth, and (e) job applicant faking. 
Hypothesis 10a-e: Job applicants’ felt obligation toward the organization 
mediates the relationship between negative diagnostic information seeking and (a) the 
establishment and (b) length of self-imposed decision deadlines, (c) positive word of 
mouth, (d) negative word of mouth, and (e) job applicant faking, 
Hypothesis 11a-e: The relationship between positive diagnostic information 
seeking, felt obligation, and (a) the establishment and (b) length of self-imposed decision 
deadlines, (c) positive word of mouth, (d) negative word of mouth, and (e) job applicant 
faking, will be conditional on job applicants’ perceptions of hiring likelihood. 
Hypothesis 12a-e: The relationship between negative diagnostic information 
seeking, felt obligation, and (a) the establishment and (b) length of self-imposed decision 
deadlines, (c) positive word of mouth, (d) negative word of mouth, and (e) job applicant 







4.1 Research Design Overview 
 The research design utilizes a multimethod approach, composed of an experiment 
and a field study, that seeks to balance both the strengths and the weaknesses inherent in 
utilizing a single method (Brewer & Hunter, 1989). From a broad perspective, the use of 
experimental and field methods balance internal and external validity concerns, with 
experiments maximizing internal validity and field surveys maximizing external validity 
(McGrath, 1981). More specifically, the experiment will lend support to the causal 
interpretations (James, Mulaik, & Brett, 1982) implied by social exchange theory 
(Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005) while the field survey will support the generalizability of 
the results. Both experimental and field survey designs are quantitative methods which 
are appropriate for investigating well-developed theories and phenomena such as social 
exchange theory and recruitment (Edmondson & McManus, 2007).  
4.2 Study 1: Experiment 
4.2.1 Sample and design 
Participants were recruited from introductory organizational behavior and human 
resources classes at a university in the southeastern United States. Participation in the 
experiment was one option to fulfill a course requirement. Diagnostic information 
seeking (positive, negative, both positive and negative, and control) was manipulated, 
resulting in a one factor, between-subjects design. Contrasting the positive (negative) 
diagnostic information seeking condition with the control condition will serve to test the 
hypotheses regarding the impact of positive (negative) diagnostic information seeking on 
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the dependent variables of interest through felt obligation. The addition of a condition 
with both positive and negative diagnostic information seeking was included for 
exploratory purposes. While not formally hypothesized, a logical possibility based on the 
theoretical framework proposed would be that applicants might, through mental calculus, 
net the effects of positive diagnostic information seeking and negative diagnostic 
information seeking together in their determination of felt obligation, such that the effects 
of these differing information seeking strategies might somehow “cancel” each other out 
in an additive fashion. However, for reasons detailed below, based on the manipulation 
check results, this additional condition was instead combined with the control condition 
ultimately resulting in a more conservative test of the hypotheses. The final sample (i.e., 
after exclusion of the subjects in the positive and negative diagnostic information seeking 
condition which is described below) was composed of 162 participants with the following 
characteristics: 58.02% female; average age of 20.83 (s.d. = 2.50); 67.28% Caucasian, 
7.41% Black, 3.09% Hispanic, 14.81% Asian, and 7.41% Other; 50% were employed 
either part-time, full-time, or self-employed; and on average subjects had 25.03 months 
of work experience (s.d. = 45.87). 
4.2.2 Procedure 
 Upon entering the lab, subjects were directed to a private computer workstation 
where they were informed that an organization has requested assistance in evaluating its 
recruiting practices and their task today is to take the role of an active job seeker and 
complete the application materials as if they were trying to obtain employment with the 
organization. Students were told that, in an effort to increase the realism of the study, the 
organization would evaluate the applications as if they were real and award a $5 gift card 
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to those students they chose to give a “job offer” to. Prior studies have similarly provided 
extra credit or cash as an incentive to increase effort (e.g., Liden, Martin, & Parsons, 
1993; Martin & Nagao, 1989; Potosky & Bobko, 1997). In actuality, there was no 
organization and the application was the means of delivering the manipulations and 
measuring the variables of interest. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the 
following conditions outlined below. The complete experiment procedures are included 
in Appendix A. 
 Diagnostic information seeking manipulations. The positive, negative, and 
positive and negative diagnostic information seeking manipulations, as well as the 
control, were delivered through a series of open-ended questions that subjects were asked 
to complete as part of the application. To prevent ordering effects, the order of the items 
in each manipulation was randomized. 
 Positive diagnostic information seeking manipulation. Drawing from prior work 
(Sackett, 1982), subjects in the positive diagnostic information seeking condition 
received the following questions as part of their application: 
1. “Describe a time when your work was praised.”  
2. “What is your strongest subject in school?”  
3. “What has been your most rewarding extracurricular activity (e.g., job, interest 
club, athletics, sorority/fraternity)?” 
4.  “Please describe a time where you helped improve your community.”  
5.  “What has been your biggest accomplishment to date (academic, personal, or 
professional)?” 
6. “What skill or expertise do you feel you’ve mastered?”  
7. “Describe an academic, personal, or professional experience you’ve had that will 
help you be a good employee.” 
8.  “What would others see as your personal strengths that might assist you in 
achieving your academic and professional goals?”  
 Negative diagnostic information seeking manipulation. Subjects in the negative 
diagnostic information seeking condition were asked the following questions: 
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1. “Describe a time when your work was criticized.”  
2. “What is your weakest subject in school?” 
3. “Describe your most severe violation of the academic honor code (e.g., cheated 
during an exam, copied homework, helped someone cheat during an exam, stolen 
an exam, etc.)?” 
4.  “Please describe any convictions you have had for a criminal offense, felony, or 
misdemeanor.”  
5. “What has been your biggest failure to date (academic, personal, or 
professional)?”  
6. “What skill or expertise do you feel you’re lacking?” 
7. “Describe a conflict you have had with co-workers or classmates at any of your 
previous jobs or classes.” 
8. “What would others see as your personal weaknesses that might prevent you from 
achieving your academic and professional goals?” 
 Positive and negative diagnostic information seeking manipulation. Subjects in 
the positive and negative diagnostic information seeking condition were asked the 
following questions: 
1. “What skill or expertise do you feel you’ve mastered?”  
2. “What skill or expertise do you feel you’re lacking?”  
3. “What has been your biggest accomplishment to date (academic, personal, or 
professional)?” 
4. “What has been your biggest failure to date (academic, personal, or 
professional)?” 
5. “Describe an academic, personal, or professional experience you’ve had that will 
help you be a good employee.” 
6. “Describe a conflict you have had with co-workers or classmates at any of your 
previous jobs or classes.” 
7. “What would others see as your personal strengths that might assist you in 
achieving your academic and professional goals?” 
8.  “What would others see as your personal weaknesses that might prevent you 
from achieving your academic and professional goals?” 
 Control condition. Subjects in the control condition were asked the following: 
1. “What is your preferred method of communicating with co-workers (e.g., e-mail, 
instant message, face-to-face, phone, video chat, or text message)?” 
2. “What personality type do you prefer to work with?” 
3. “When trying to make progress on an important project, do you usually stay late 
at work or go in early to work? Why?” 
4. “What functional area of an organization (e.g., human resources, marketing, IT, 
accounting, finance, operations management, etc.) do you think is most 
important? Why?” 
5. “How did you go about choosing a major?” 
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6. “How do you organize your work day?” 
7. “What would you do if you were in a team meeting that was going over its 
scheduled time and you had another obligation to attend to?” 
8. “What is one question you would ask a potential employer before accepting a 
job?” 
4.2.3 Mediator 
 Felt obligation. Felt obligation was measured utilizing seven likert-type items 
from the scale developed by Eisenberger and colleagues (2001) with  = .85 
1. I feel a personal obligation to do whatever I can to help the organization achieve 
its goals. 
2. I owe it to the organization to give my energy to the organization's goals during 
the recruiting process. 
3. I have an obligation to the organization to ensure that I behave in a high-quality 
way during the recruiting process. 
4. I owe it to the organization to do what I can to ensure that the organization is well 
served and satisfied. 
5. I would feel an obligation to help the organization if it needed my help. 
6. I would feel guilty if I did not meet the organization's expectations of me. 
7. I feel that the only obligation I have to the organization is to fulfill the minimum 
expectations of a job applicant. 
4.2.4 Moderator 
 Hiring likelihood. Hiring likelihood perceptions were measured utilizing an 
adaptation of the four item likert-type scale developed by Chapman, Uggerslev, and 
Webster (2003) with  = .89: 
1. I am certain I will be offered a job with this organization. 
2. I expect to get a job offer as a result of my performance on the application. 
3. I will probably not get hired for this job. (R) 
4. I feel positive about the outcome of this job application. 
4.2.5 Dependent variables 
 Self-imposed decision deadlines. The establishment of self-imposed decision 
deadlines was assessed by asking subjects, “If this company gave you a job offer with a 
deadline for responding, what is the probability that you would respond earlier than the 
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deadline (0% = no chance; 100% = absolute certainty)?” The length of self-imposed 
decision deadlines was measured by asking subjects “How many days earlier than the 
deadline would you respond?”  
Positive word of mouth. Positive word of mouth was assessed utilizing an 
adaptation of the likert-type scales developed by Alexandrov, Lilly, and Babakus (2013) 
and Van Hoye and Lievens (2009) with  = .96: 
Based on your experiences with the organization today, how likely would you be to 
do any of the following if given the opportunity… 
1. Say positive things about this organization. 
2. Recommend this organization to others. 
3. Recommend this organization to someone else who seeks your advice. 
4. Spend time telling people positive things about the organization. 
5. Spend time recommending the organization as an employer to family, friends, or 
acquaintances. 
Negative word of mouth. Negative word of mouth was measured utilizing an 
adaptation of the likert-type scales developed by Alexandrov, Lilly, and Babakus (2013) 
and Van Hoye and Lievens (2009) with  = .95: 
Based on your experiences with the organization today, how likely would you be to 
do any of the following if given the opportunity… 
1. Warn my friends and relatives not to apply to this organization. 
2. Complain to my friends and relatives about this organization. 
3. Say negative things about this organization to other people. 
4. Spend time telling people negative things about the organization. 
5. Spend time advising against the organization as an employer to family, friends, or 
acquaintances. 
 
Faking. Subject faking was assessed by asking participants to complete a 
variation of the adding-to-10 task developed by Mazar, Amir, and Ariely (2008) as part 
of the supposed job application. The instructions stated that the organization was 
evaluating candidates’ tolerance for the complexity inherent in the recruitment process 
through the evaluation of their performance on a task. In this task, subjects were 
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presented with 10 matrices each containing 12 three-digit numbers (e.g., 3.14) and were 
instructed to solve as many matrices as possible in 2 minutes by identifying a pair of 
numbers in the matrix that equal to 10 when they are summed (e.g., 3.14 and 6.86). The 
instructions stated that the subjects must solve the matrices in order and could not skip a 
matrix. After the time elapsed, subjects were told that an average job candidate should be 
able to solve at least 3 matrices and they were asked to report the number of matrices 
they solved to the organization as part of the job application. In actuality, the third matrix 
was unsolvable. Faking was measured as a continuous variable with subjects coded as 
zero when they reporting solving two or less matrices and subjects being coded as 1 (2, 3, 
4, etc.) when they reported solving 3 (4, 5, 6, etc.) matrices.  
4.2.6 Manipulation check items 
 Developing positive and negative diagnostic information seeking measures. 
Building on prior research on information diagnosticity and interview questioning 
intentions (Herr et al., 1991; Sackett, 1982), two measures were created to assess the 
success of the diagnostic information seeking manipulations. Based on scale development 
guidelines promulgated by Hinkin (1995, 1998), an iterative process was used wherein 
items were matched to the definitions for positive and negative diagnostic information 
seeking while ensuring sampling from the relevant theoretical domain. This process 
resulted in the following items: 
 Positive diagnostic information seeking,  = .91. 
1. The organization seeks out positive information about job applicants in order to 
select an appropriate person to hire. 
2. The organization tries to discover positive things about job applicants in order to 
identify a good job applicant. 
3. The organization looks for desirable attributes about job applicants in order to 
pick a quality candidate. 
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4. The organization attempts to learn favorable information about job applicants in 
order to find the ideal person to hire. 
 Negative diagnostic information seeking,  = .96. 
1. The organization seeks out negative information about job applicants in order to 
eliminate them from consideration. 
2. The organization tries to discover negative things about job applicants in order to 
“weed them out.” 
3. The organization looks for undesirable attributes about job applicants in order to 
disqualify them from hiring. 
4. The organization attempts to learn unfavorable information about job applicants 
in order to screen them out. 
 Following this, a pilot study was conducted to ensure that the positive and 
negative diagnostic information seeking measures had adequate discriminant and 
convergent validity with each other and related measures (e.g., opportunity to perform 
and invasion of privacy). The pilot study recruited subjects from MTurk who were 
compensated $0.52 for completing a job application task (with accompanying cover 
story) similar to the main study wherein positive, negative, and both positive and 
negative diagnostic information seeking were manipulated and contrasted with a control 
condition. The final sample was composed of 92 participants with the following 
characteristics: 38% female; average age of 35.17 (s.d. = 12.16); 84.78% Caucasian, 
7.61% Black, 3.26% Hispanic, 1.09% Native American, and 3.26% Asian; 1.09% 
completed some high school, 15.22% were high school graduate, 19.57% completed 
some college, 13.04% completed associate’s degree, 33.70% obtained bachelor’s degree, 
15.22% earned a master’s degree, and 2.17% have a doctorate; 36.96% were currently 
actively looking for a job; 65.22% were employed either part-time or full-time. 
 Subjects were instructed to complete the positive and negative diagnostic 
information seeking measures based on their experiences on the job application. In 
addition, subjects also completed the following opportunity to perform (Bauer et al., 
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2001) and information privacy (Alge, Ballinger, Tangirala, & Oakley, 2006) measures. 
All measures were assessed utilizing a five-point scale from 1 “strongly disagree” to 5 
“strongly agree”. 
Opportunity to Perform. Opportunity to perform was measured utilizing the 
four item scale developed by Bauer and colleagues (2001) with  = .94: 
1. I could really show my skills and abilities during the hiring process. 
2. The hiring process allowed me to show what my job skills are. 
3. The hiring process gives applicants the opportunity to show what they can really 
do. 
4. I was able to show what I can do during the hiring process.  
Information privacy. Information privacy was measured utilizing the four item 
scale developed by Alge and colleagues (Alge et al., 2006) with  = .93: 
1. I was able to keep the organization from collecting personal information about me 
that I would have liked to keep secret. 
2. I determined the types of information that the organization could store about me. 
3. I am completely satisfied that I was able to keep the organization from collecting 
personal information about me that I wanted to keep from them.  
4. I am satisfied in my ability to control the types of personal information that the 
organization collected on me. 
 A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) completed in the lavaan package (Rosseel, 
2012) for the R environment (R Development Core Team, 2015) supports the 
discriminant validity of the measures with a four-factor structure (χ2 = 141.73 [df = 98], p 
< 0.01; CFI = .97; SRMR = .04) fitting the data significantly better than a three-factor 
model combining positive diagnostic information seeking and opportunity to perform (χ2 
= 418.21 [df = 101], p < 0.01; CFI = .78; SRMR = .13), a two-factor model combining 
positive diagnostic information seeking and opportunity to perform and negative 
diagnostic information seeking and information privacy (χ2 = 713.82 [df = 103], p < 0.01; 
CFI = .57; SRMR = .21), and a one-factor model combining positive diagnostic 
information seeking, negative diagnostic information seeking, opportunity to perform, 
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and information privacy (χ2 = 981.46. [df = 104], p < 0.01; CFI = .38; SRMR = .21). In 
addition, a non-nested three factor model combining positive diagnostic information 
seeking and negative diagnostic information seeking fit the data poorly (χ2 = 362.92 [df = 
101], p < 0.01; CFI = .81; SRMR = .14).  
 The pattern of correlations between positive diagnostic information seeking, 
negative diagnostic information seeking, opportunity to perform, and information privacy 
support the convergent validity of the diagnostic information seeking measures. As 
excepted positive diagnostic information seeking was positively correlated with 
opportunity to perform (r = .46) and negatively correlated with negative diagnostic 
information seeking (r = -.54). Similarly, negative diagnostic information seeking was 
negatively correlated with information privacy (r = -.17). Given the reliability, 
discriminant validity, and convergent validity of the newly developed positive diagnostic 
information seeking and negative diagnostic information seeking measures, these 
measures were used to conduct the manipulation check for the main experiment. 
4.2.7 Control variables 
 Plausible alternative mechanisms, as suggested by extant literature, were 
statistically controlled for2. In particular, the mediating effect of another indicator of 
organization desirability, prestige (Highhouse et al., 2003) was controlled. Given that 
prestige captures “a social consensus on the degree to which the company’s 
characteristics are regarded as either positive or negative” (Highhouse et al., 2003, p. 
989), prestige might be related to the extent applicants intend to engage in word of 
mouth, which is an inherently social form of information reciprocation (Van Hoye & 
                                                     
2 A summary of results excluding control variables are presented as part of supplementary analyses 
(Appendix J). Results improved after excluding control variables. 
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Lievens, 2009). Moreover, organizations that engage in relatively more negative 
diagnostic information seeking might be viewed as signaling higher prestige, since they 
are presumably seeking to narrow down their relatively larger applicant pool. Positive 
and negative affect (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) were also input as control 
variables; it seems plausible that answering more negative questions about one’s self (as 
a result of negative diagnostic information seeking) could influence negative mood, 
which could have the same effect on the proposed mediators and dependent variables. 
Similar logic applies for the inclusion of positive diagnostic information seeking and 
positive affect. 
Prestige. Prestige was measured utilizing the five item scale developed 
Highhouse and colleagues (Highhouse et al., 2003) with  = .93. 
1. Employees are probably proud to say they work at this company. 
2. This is a reputable company to work for. 
3. This company probably has a reputation as being an excellent employer. 
4. I would find this company a prestigious place to work. 
5. There are probably many who would like to work at this company. 
Positive affect. Positive affect was assessed utilizing the ten item PANAS scale 
developed by Watson, Clark, and Tellegen (1988) with  = .92. Subjects were given the 
following list of words and asked to indicate to what extent they felt this way right now at 












Negative affect. Negative affect was assessed utilizing the ten item PANAS scale 
developed by Watson et al. (1988) with  = .79. Subjects were given the following list of 












4.2.8 Preliminary analyses 
 Manipulation check. The success of each manipulation was assessed with 
ANOVA in SPSS 22.0 by examining whether there was a statistically significant main 
effect on the manipulation check by the intended manipulation. Each condition was 
dummy coded. Tukey post hoc comparisons show that subjects in the positive diagnostic 
information seeking condition reported higher levels of positive diagnostic information 
seeking by the organization (M = 4.22, SD = .54) compared to subjects in the control 
condition (M = 3.72, SD = .56; p < .01) and the negative diagnostic information seeking 
condition (M = 2.83, SD = 1.21; p < .01). Similarly, subjects in the negative diagnostic 
information seeking condition reported higher levels of negative diagnostic information 
seeking by the organization (M = 3.90, SD = .90) compared to subjects in the control 
condition (M = 2.47, SD = .79; p < .01) and the positive diagnostic information seeking 
condition (M = 1.82, SD = .68; p < .01).  
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However, manipulation check results with respect to the third condition of 
positive and negative diagnostic information seeking were inconclusive and do not lend 
themselves to clear unambiguous interpretations of subject responses in this condition. In 
particular, the responses to the positive diagnostic information seeking manipulation 
check items by subjects in the positive and negative diagnostic information seeking 
condition (M = 4.00, SD = .48) were not significantly different from responses by 
subjects in the control condition (M = 3.72, SD = .56; p > .05). However, responses on 
the negative diagnostic information seeking manipulation check from subjects in the 
positive and negative diagnostic information seeking condition (M = 2.93, SD = 1.08) 
were significantly different from the control condition (M = 2.47, SD = .79; p < .05) and 
the negative diagnostic information seeking condition (M = 3.90, SD = .90; p < .05). As a 
result, interpreting the results from the subjects in the positive and negative diagnostic 
information seeking condition would be difficult because these subjects seem to be 
equivalent to the control condition subjects on their perceived level of positive diagnostic 
information seeking manipulated in the experiment but different from the control 
condition on their perceived level of negative diagnostic information seeking; in this 
sense, it is unclear whether subjects in the positive and negative diagnostic information 
seeking condition recognized the positive diagnostic information seeking manipulation 
(vis-à-vis the control condition subjects). This result may be happening due to subjects’ 
difficulty in distinguishing between high levels of negative diagnostic information 
seeking and low levels of positive diagnostic information seeking or the notion that “bad 
is stronger than good” (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001). To prevent 
ambiguous interpretations of regression results, this condition was excluded from further 
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analysis. All results presented below do not include subjects from the positive and 
negative diagnostic information seeking condition3. A separate set of exploratory 
analyses were assessed with this condition and presented following the discussion. 
As a supplement to the manipulation checks, participants’ actual responses to the 
manipulations were qualitatively coded (on a 1 to 5 scale) by a research assistant based 
on the extent to which subjects’ responses contained positive information and negative 
information. Results from this coding are shown in Figure 2A and 2B. With respect to the 
positive diagnostic information seeking manipulation, participant responses were 
consistent with what would be expected. In particular, the extent of positive responses 
was significantly greater in the positive diagnostic information seeking condition (M = 
4.10) than in the control condition (M = 1.90, p < .05). Similarly, the extent of negative 
responses was significantly greater in the negative diagnostic information seeking 
condition (M = 4.16) than in the control condition (M = 1.31, p < .05). Altogether, these 
results suggest that there is a match between the type of information sought by an 
organization (i.e., positive or negative information) and the actual information that is 
provided by the job applicant. 
 Confirmatory factor analysis. A CFA was completed on the hiring likelihood, 
felt obligation, positive word of mouth, and negative word of mouth variables in the 
lavaan package (Rosseel, 2012) for the R environment (R Development Core Team, 
2015). Faking, the establishment of self-imposed decision deadlines, and the length of  
                                                     
3 A summary of hypotheses testing combining the positive and negative diagnostic information seeking 
condition with the control condition is presented as part of supplementary analyses (Appendix J). Given the 
significantly larger effect of the positive and negative diagnostic information seeking manipulation 
(compared to the control condition) on the negative diagnostic information seeking check, this represents a 
more conservative test of the effects of negative diagnostic information seeking. Interestingly, results 
improved slightly as a result of combining these two conditions. This may be due to an increase in sample 
size compared to excluding the positive and negative diagnostic information seeking condition (n = 162 to 









Supplemental analysis - Study 1: Negative responses provided by subjects by 
condition 
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self-imposed decision deadlines were excluded based on suggestions that two indicators 
is the minimum amount required for a factor due to model identification issues (Kline, 
2015). The correlation between the establishment of self-imposed decision deadlines and 
the length of self-imposed decision deadlines was .40 and Cronbach’s alpha was .57, 
suggesting that there is ample discriminant validity between these measures4. Results 
from the CFA support the discriminant validity of the measures. Based on criteria 
proposed by Hu and Bentler (1999), a four-factor structure containing hiring likelihood, 
felt obligation, positive word of mouth, and negative word of mouth. (χ2 = 354.00 [df = 
183], p < 0.01; CFI = .94; SRMR = .06) fit the data significantly better than a three-factor 
model combining positive and negative word of mouth (χ2 = 1077.18. [df = 186], p < 
0.01; CFI = .70; SRMR = .12); a two-factor model combining positive and negative word 
of mouth and combining hiring likelihood and felt obligation (χ2 = 1409.89 [df = 188], p 
< 0.01; CFI = .59; SRMR = .17); and a one-factor model combining all four measures (χ2 
= 1686.77 [df = 189], p < 0.01; CFI = .50; SRMR = .16). 
4.2.9 Results 










                                                     
4 A CFA utilizing all 9 variables results in the same conclusions: a 9 factor model (CFI= .95) fit the data 
significantly better than an 8 factor model combining negative diagnostic information seeking and felt 
obligation (CFI = .92), a 7 factor model combining negative diagnostic information seeking, positive 
diagnostic information seeking, and felt obligation (CFI=.92), a 6 factor model combining positive 
diagnostic information seeking, negative diagnostic information seeking, felt obligation, and hiring 
likelihood perceptions (CFI=.90), and other rival models combining the dependent variables. 
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Table 1 




















Study 1 Study 2
H1 Positive diagnostic information seeking -> felt obligation n.s. n.s.
H2 Positive diagnostic information seeking -> hiring likelihood n.s. p ≤ .05
H3 Negative diagnostic information seeking -> felt obligation n.s. n.s.
H4 Negative diagnostic information seeking -> hiring likelihood p ≤ .09 n.s.
H5a Positive diagnostic information seeking X hiring likelihood -> felt obligation n.s. p ≤ .05
H5b Negative diagnostic information seeking X hiring likelihood -> felt obligation n.s. n.s.
H6a Felt obligation -> self-imposed decision deadline n.s. n.s.
H6b Felt obligation -> length of self-imposed decision deadline p ≤ .05 n.s.
H7a Felt obligation -> positive word of mouth p ≤ .01 n.s.
H7b Felt obligation -> negative word of mouth n.s. n/a
H8 Felt obligation -> faking n.s. n.s.
H9a Positive diagnostic information seeking -> felt obligation -> self-imposed decision deadline n.s. n.s.
H9b Positive diagnostic information seeking -> felt obligation -> length of self-imposed decision deadline p ≤ .05 n.s.
H9c Positive diagnostic information seeking -> felt obligation -> positive word of mouth p ≤ .06 n.s.
H9d Positive diagnostic information seeking -> felt obligation -> negative word of mouth n.s. n/a
H9e Positive diagnostic information seeking -> felt obligation -> faking n.s. p ≤ .07
H10a Negative diagnostic information seeking -> felt obligation -> self-imposed decision deadline n.s. n.s.
H10b Negative diagnostic information seeking -> felt obligation -> length of self-imposed decision deadline p ≤ .06 n.s.
H10c Negative diagnostic information seeking -> felt obligation -> positive word of mouth p ≤ .09 n.s.
H10d Negative diagnostic information seeking -> felt obligation -> negative word of mouth n.s. n/a
H10e Negative diagnostic information seeking -> felt obligation -> faking n.s. n.s.
H11a Positive diagnostic information seeking X hiring likelihood -> felt obligation -> self-imposed decision deadline n.s. n.s.
H11b Positive diagnostic information seeking X hiring likelihood -> felt obligation -> length of self-imposed decision deadline n.s. n.s.
H11c Positive diagnostic information seeking X hiring likelihood-> felt obligation -> positive word of mouth n.s. n.s.
H11d Positive diagnostic information seeking X hiring likelihood -> felt obligation -> negative word of mouth n.s. n/a
H11e Positive diagnostic information seeking X hiring likelihood -> felt obligation -> faking n.s. p ≤ .09
H12a Negative diagnostic information seeking X hiring likelihood -> felt obligation -> self-imposed decision deadline n.s. n.s.
H12b Negative diagnostic information seeking X hiring likelihood -> felt obligation -> length of self-imposed decision deadline n.s. n.s.
H12c Negative diagnostic information seeking X hiring likelihood-> felt obligation -> positive word of mouth n.s. n.s.
H12d Negative diagnostic information seeking X hiring likelihood -> felt obligation -> negative word of mouth n.s. n/a










ns, standard deviations, and correlations (Study 1)
M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1. Positive affect 2.33 0.88 ---
2. Negative affect 1.31 0.40 .07 ---
3. Prestige 3.12 0.66 .42** -.12 ---
4 Positive diagnostic info. seeking1 0.31 0.47 .12 -.18* .24** ---
5. Negative diagnostic info. seeking2 0.35 0.48 -.12 .25** -.20* -.49** ---
6. Hiring likelihood 3.04 0.80 .42** -.20* .52** .14 -.24** ---
7. Felt obligation 3.67 0.73 .37** -.02 .41** .22** -.21** .35** ---
8 Self-imposed decision deadline 6.03 3.19 .33** -.14 .41** .11 -.18* .43** .29** ---
9 Self-imposed decision deadline length 2.70 3.26 .13 -.09 .24** -.02 .11 .18* .24** .40** ---
10. Positive word of mouth 2.97 0.86 .45** -.19* .74** .19* -.27** .56** .46** .45** .18* ---
11. Negative word of mouth 2.22 0.87 -.23** .31** -.47** -.31** .51** -.42** -.28** -.36** -.13 -.51** ---
12. Faking 1.17 1.56 .13 .08 .16* .08 .08 .05 .07 .02 .08 .17* .02
Note:  N = 162.
1Dummy Variable (1 = Positive diagnostic information seeking condition, 0 = Control)
2Dummy Variable (1 = Negative diagnostic information seeking condition, 0 = Control)




 Hypotheses 1-7b were tested utilizing multiple regression analysis in SPSS 22.0. 
Model 2 in Table 3 shows the results of the test of Hypothesis 1 which argues for a 
positive relationship between positive diagnostic information seeking and felt obligation 
toward the organization. There was no support for this hypothesis as positive diagnostic 
information seeking was not significantly related to felt obligation (β = .09, p > .05) after 
the control variables. Hypothesis 2 posited a similar positive relationship between 
positive diagnostic information seeking and perceptions of hiring likelihood. As outlined 
in Model 5 of Table 3, Hypothesis 2 not supported (β = -.08, p > .05). 
 Hypotheses 3 and 4 proposed a negative relationship between negative diagnostic 
information seeking and both felt obligation and perceptions of hiring likelihood. Based 
on Model 2 of Table 3, Hypothesis 3 was not supported (β = -.10, p > .05). Hypothesis 4 
was not supported as Model 5 of Table 3 shows a marginally significant negative 
relationship between negative diagnostic information seeking and perceptions of hiring 
likelihood (β = -.13, p < .10), after the effect of control variables. 
Hypothesis 5a proposes a moderating effect of hiring likelihood perceptions on 
the relationship between positive diagnostic information seeking and felt obligation. 
Model 3 of Table 3 evidences a non-significant moderating effect of hiring likelihood 
perceptions (β = -.05, p > .05). Thus, Hypothesis 5a was not supported. Similarly, 
Hypothesis 5b, which proposes a moderating effect of hiring likelihood perceptions on 
the relationship between negative diagnostic information seeking and felt obligation was 
not supported (β = .02, p > .05).
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Table 3 
Summary of regression results on felt obligation and hiring likelihood (Study 1)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Variable B SE(B ) β B SE(B) β B SE(B) β B SE(B ) β B SE(B) β
Constant 2.16** 0.32 2.20** 0.32 2.41** 0.35 -1.58** 0.32 -1.49** 0.32
Controls
Positive affect 0.20** 0.07 0.24** 0.19** 0.07 0.23** 0.17** 0.07 0.20* 0.24** 0.07 0.26** 0.23** 0.07 0.26**
Negative affect -0.01 0.13 0.00 0.06 0.14 0.03 0.11 0.14 0.06 -0.35** 0.13 -0.18** -0.32* 0.14 -0.16*
Prestige 0.34** 0.09 0.31** 0.31** 0.09 0.28** 0.23* 0.10 0.21* 0.48** 0.09 0.39** 0.47** 0.09 0.39**
Predictors
Positive diagnostic information seeking1 0.14 0.13 0.09 0.18 0.13 0.11 -0.13 0.13 -0.08
Negative diagnostic information seeking2 -0.15 0.13 -0.10 -0.11 0.13 -0.07 -0.22† 0.13 -.13†
Hiring likelihood 0.14 0.12 0.15
Interactions
Positive diagnostic information seeking X hiring likelihood -0.08 0.17 -0.05
Negative diagnostic information seeking X hiring likelihood 0.03 0.16 0.02
R .46** .48** .50** .59** .60**
R 2 .21** .24** .25** .35** .36**
∆R 2 .02† .01 .01
Adjusted R 2 .20 .21 .21 .34 .34
Note:  N  = 162. 
1Dummy Variable (1 = Positive diagnostic information seeking condition, 0 = Control)
2Dummy Variable (1 = Negative diagnostic information seeking condition, 0 = Control)
 † p ≤ .10. * p ≤ .05. ** p ≤ .01. 
Felt Obligation Felt ObligationFelt Obligation Hiring Likelihood Hiring Likelihood
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Hypothesis 6a posits a positive relationship between felt obligation toward the 
organization and the establishment of self-imposed decision deadlines while Hypothesis 
6b suggests a positive relationship between felt obligation toward the organization and 
the length of self-imposed decision deadlines. After controlling for positive affect, 
negative affect, prestige, and the direct effects of positive and negative diagnostic 
information seeking, Hypothesis 6a was not support (β = .10, p > .05; see Model 3 of 
Table 4); on the other hand, Hypothesis 6b was supported (β = .21, p < .05; see Model 6 
of Table 4) above and beyond the controls. 
Hypothesis 7a, which hypothesizes a positive relationship between felt obligation 
and positive word of mouth, was supported (β = .16, p < .01, see Model 3 of Table 5), 
above and beyond the effects of positive affect, negative affect, prestige, and the direct 
effects of positive and negative diagnostic information seeking. Hypothesis 7b, which 
hypothesizes a negative relationship between felt obligation and negative word of mouth, 
was not supported after controlling for the effects of positive affect, negative affect, 
prestige, and the direct effects of positive and negative diagnostic information seeking (β 
= -.05, p > .05, see Model 6 of Table 5). 
Hypothesis 8 proposes a negative relationship between felt obligation and faking. 
After controlling for the effects of positive affect, negative affect, prestige, and the direct 
effects of positive and negative diagnostic information seeking, Hypothesis 8 was not 
supported (β = -.01, p > .05). 
 Hypotheses 9a through 9e propose that felt obligation mediates the indirect effects 
of positive diagnostic information seeking on the dependent variables. Table 7 displays 
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Table 4 








Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Variable B SE(B) β B SE(B) β B SE(B) β B SE(B ) β B SE(B ) β B SE(B) β
Constant 0.94 1.40 1.22 1.42 0.24 1.61 -0.25 1.55 -0.73 1.56 -2.82 1.74
Controls
Positive affect 0.78** 0.28 0.22** 0.76** 0.29 0.21** 0.68* 0.29 0.19* 0.15 0.32 0.04 0.21 0.31 0.06 0.03 0.32 0.01
Negative affect -0.94 0.58 -0.12 -0.82 0.60 -0.10 -0.84 0.60 -0.11 -0.57 0.64 -0.07 -0.95 0.65 -0.12 -1.00 0.64 -0.12
Prestige 1.45** 0.38 0.30** 1.43** 0.39 0.30** 1.29** 0.40 0.27** 1.07* 0.42 0.22* 1.21** 0.43 0.25** 0.92* 0.44 0.19*
IVs
Positive diagnostic information seeking1 -0.34 0.57 -0.05 -0.40 0.57 -0.06 -0.09 0.62 -0.01 -0.23 0.61 -0.03
Negative diagnostic information seeking2 -0.66 0.56 -0.10 -0.59 0.56 -0.09 1.27* 0.61 0.19* 1.41* 0.60 0.21*
Mediator
Felt Obligation 0.44 0.35 0.10 0.95* 0.38 0.21*
R .46** .47** .47** .25* .31** .36**
R 2 .21** .22** .23** .06** .10** .13**
∆R 2 .01 .01 .03† .04*
Adjusted R 2 .20 .19 .20 .05 .07 .10
Note:  N  = 162. 
1Dummy Variable (1 = Positive diagnostic information seeking condition, 0 = Control)
2Dummy Variable (1 = Negative diagnostic information seeking condition, 0 = Control)
 † p ≤ .10. * p ≤ .05. ** p ≤ .01. 
Self-Imposed Decision Self-Imposed Decision Self-Imposed Deadline Length Self-Imposed Deadline LengthSelf-Imposed Decision Self-Imposed Deadline Length
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Table 5 













Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Variable B SE(B ) β B SE(B ) β B SE(B) β B SE(B ) β B SE(B) β B SE(B) β
Constant 0.29 0.28 0.39 0.28 -0.02 0.31 3.32** 0.36 3.05** 0.33 3.17** 0.38
Controls
Positive affect 0.18** 0.06 0.19** 0.18** 0.06 0.18** 0.14* 0.06 0.15* -0.08 0.07 -0.08 -0.05 0.07 -0.05 -0.04 0.07 -0.04
Negative affect -0.28* 0.11 -0.13* -0.25* 0.12 -0.11* -0.26* 0.11 -0.12* 0.89** 0.15 0.27** 0.39** 0.14 0.18** 0.39** 0.14 0.18**
Prestige 0.84** 0.08 0.64** 0.84** 0.08 0.64** 0.78** 0.08 0.60** -0.54** 0.10 -0.41** -0.47** 0.09 -0.36** -0.46** 0.10 -0.34**
IVs
Positive diagnostic information seeking1 -0.12 0.11 -0.07 -0.15 0.11 -0.08 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.00
Negative diagnostic information seeking2 -0.22* 0.11 -0.12* -0.19† 0.11 -0.11† 0.70** 0.13 0.38** 0.70** 0.13 0.38**
Mediator
Felt Obligation 0.18** 0.07 0.16** -0.05 0.08 -0.05
R .76** .77** .78** .54** .66** .66**
R 2 .58** .59** .61** .30** .43** .43**
∆R 2 0.01 .02** .13** .00
Adjusted R 2 .58 .58 .60 .28 .41 .41
Note:  N  = 162. 
1Dummy Variable (1 = Positive diagnostic information seeking condition, 0 = Control)
2Dummy Variable (1 = Negative diagnostic information seeking condition, 0 = Control)
 † p ≤ .10. * p ≤ .05. ** p ≤ .01. 
Positive Word of Mouth Positive Word of Mouth Negative Word of Mouth Negative Word of MouthPositive Word of Mouth Negative Word of Mouth
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Table 6 
Summary of regression results on faking (Study 1) 
  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Variable B SE(B ) β B SE(B ) β B SE(B) β
Constant -0.65 0.75 -0.89 0.76 -0.84 0.87
Controls
Positive affect 0.11 0.15 0.06 0.12 0.15 0.07 0.13 0.16 0.07
Negative affect 0.37 0.31 0.09 0.30 0.32 0.08 0.30 0.32 0.08
Prestige 0.34† 0.21 0.15† 0.34 0.21 0.14 0.34 0.22 0.15
IVs
Positive diagnostic information seeking1 0.45 0.30 0.14 0.45 0.30 0.14
Negative diagnostic information seeking2 0.54† 0.30 0.17† 0.54† 0.30 0.16†
Mediator
Felt Obligation -0.02 0.19 -0.01
R .20† .25† .25
R 2 .04† .06† .06
∆R 2 .02 .00
Adjusted R 2 .02 .03 .03
Note:  N  = 162. 
1Dummy Variable (1 = Positive diagnostic information seeking condition, 0 = Control)
2Dummy Variable (1 = Negative diagnostic information seeking condition, 0 = Control)




Unstandardized indirect effect of positive diagnostic information seeking (through felt obligation) and the associated 95% 





Positive Word of 
Mouth
Negative Word of 
Mouth Faking
Positive diagnostic information seeking1,2 0.11 0.23* 0.04† -.01 -.01
(-.04, .49) (.01, .76) (-.00, .13) (-.10, .03) (-.13, .09)
Note:  N  = 162. 
1Dummy Variable (1 = Positive diagnostic information seeking condition, 0 = Control)
2Controls (mediator): prestige, positive affect, and negative affect; controls (independent variable): negative diagnostic information seeking
 † p ≤ .10. * p ≤ .05. ** p ≤ .01. 
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the results of five tests of indirect effects utilizing 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals 
(Preacher & Hayes, 2008) with the PROCESS macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2013). After 
controlling for the potential alternative mechanisms of positive affect, negative affect, 
and prestige, Hypotheses 9a, 9d and 9e are not supported (i.e., all 95% bootstrapped 
confidence intervals contain zero). Thus, there is no support for the mediating role of felt 
obligation in the indirect relationship between positive diagnostic information seeking 
and: the establishment of self-imposed decision deadlines, negative word of mouth, and 
faking. On the other hand, Hypothesis 9b received support (95% CI: .01, .76) providing 
evidence for the mediating role of felt obligation in the indirect relationship between 
positive diagnostic information seeking and the length of self-imposed decision 
deadlines. Hypothesis 9c was not supported. However, though the 95% confidence 
interval contained zero (-.00, .13), the 90% confidence interval did not contain zero (.00, 
.12). 
 Hypotheses 10a through 10e propose the mediating role of felt obligation in the 
indirect effect between negative diagnostic information seeking and the dependent 
variables. Hypotheses 10a through 10e were tested in the same manner as Hypotheses 9a 
through 9e. Table 8 displays the results of these five tests of indirect effects. Although all 
of the 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals contain zero, the 90% bootstrapped 
confidence intervals testing Hypotheses 10b (self-imposed decision deadline length; CI:  
-.62, -.02) and 10c (positive word of mouth; CI: -.11, -.00) did not contain zero and were 





Unstandardized indirect effect of negative diagnostic information seeking through 
felt obligation and the associated 95% confidence intervals (Study 1)
   Hypotheses 11a through 11e propose a moderated mediation model wherein the 
mediating role of felt obligation in the relationship between positive diagnostic 
information seeking and the dependent variables is a process that is contingent upon 
levels of hiring likelihood perceptions. Table 9 shows the results of these analyses 
utilizing 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) with the 
PROCESS macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2013). In sum, Hypotheses 11a through 11e were not 
supported; the 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals for the index of moderated 
mediation (Hayes, 2013) all contained zero. 
Table 9 
Index of moderated mediation and the associated 95% confidence intervals (Study 
1) 
Moderating effect of hiring likelihood perceptions on the effect of positive diagnostic 
information seeking through felt obligation 
 
 Similarly, Hypotheses 12a through 12e propose a moderated mediation model 
wherein the mediating role of felt obligation in the relationship between negative 
diagnostic information seeking and the dependent variables is a process that is contingent 
upon levels of hiring likelihood perceptions. Results displayed in Table 10 show that 





Positive Word of 
Mouth
Negative Word of 
Mouth Faking
Negative diagnostic information seeking1,2 -.09 -.20† -0.04† .01 .00
(-.45, .04) (-.73, .00) (-.13, .00) (-.02, .10) (-.07, .13)
Note:  N  = 162. 
1Dummy Variable (1 = Negative diagnostic information seeking condition, 0 = Control)
2Controls (mediator): prestige, positive affect, and negative affect; controls (independent variable): positive diagnostic information seeking
 † p ≤ .10. * p ≤ .05. ** p ≤ .01. 
Moderating effect of hiring likelihood perceptions on the effect of positive diagnostic information seeking through felt obligation
Self-Imposed Deadline Self-Imposed Deadline Length
Positive Word of 
Mouth
Negative Word of 
Mouth Faking
Positive diagnostic information seeking1,2 -.05 -.10 -.02 .01 .00
(-.39, .08) (-.52, .17) (-.10, .03) (-.02, .08) (-.04, .10)
Note:  N  = 162. 
1Dummy Variable (1 = Positive diagnostic information seeking condition, 0 = Control)
2Controls (mediator): prestige, positive affect, and negative affect; controls (independent variable): negative diagnostic information seeking and hiring likelihood
 † p ≤ .10. * p ≤ .05. ** p ≤ .01. 
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Hypotheses 12a through 12e were not supported since the 95% bootstrapped confidence 
intervals for the index of moderated mediation all contained zero. 
Table 10 
Index of moderated mediation and the associated 95% confidence intervals (Study 
1) 
Moderating effect of hiring likelihood perception on the effect of negative diagnostic 
information seeking through felt obligation 
 
4.2.10 Study 1 discussion and limitations 
 Some support was found for the proposed hypotheses. The hypotheses that were 
supported do suggest that positive diagnostic information seeking seems to operate, in 
part, through the mechanism of felt obligation (i.e., Hypothesis 9b was fully supported). 
The potentially critical role that felt obligation plays in job applicant-organization 
relationships is further evidenced by the direct effect felt obligation had in predicting the 
length of self-imposed decision deadlines and positive word of mouth. Interestingly, felt 
obligation did not significantly predict the likelihood that an individual would establish a 
self-imposed decision deadline. This finding further supports the discriminant validity 
between the likelihood of establishing self-imposed decision deadlines and the length of 
self-imposed decision deadlines. In line with goal-setting theory, which distinguishes 
between the level of the set goal and goal commitment (Klein, Wesson, Hollenbeck, & 
Alge, 1999), the length of a self-imposed decision deadline might be more akin to the 
level of a set goal while the likelihood of a self-imposed decision deadline may be more 
analogous to goal commitment. Altogether, there seems to be both theoretical and 
Moderating effect of hiring likelihood perceptions on the effect of negative diagnostic information seeking through felt obligation
Self-Imposed Deadline Self-Imposed Deadline Length
Positive Word of 
Mouth
Negative Word of 
Mouth Faking
Negative diagnostic information seeking1,2 .06 .13 .02 -.01 .00
(-.05, .41) (-.09, .67) (-.02, .11) (-.09, .02) (-.11, .05)
Note:  N  = 162. 
1Dummy Variable (1 = Negative diagnostic information seeking condition, 0 = Control)
2Controls (mediator): prestige, positive affect, and negative affect; controls (independent variable): positive diagnostic information seeking and hiring likelihood
 † p ≤ .10. * p ≤ .05. ** p ≤ .01. 
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empirical reasons for researchers to study the establishment and length of self-imposed 
decision deadlines as related but distinct constructs. 
 Several reasons potentially account for the lack of support for the proposed 
hypotheses. The first reason relates to difficulty manipulating and assessing positive 
diagnostic information seeking. The second possibility is that, given the multitude of 
potential constructs that mediate social exchange effects (Colquitt et al., 2014), felt 
obligation is not the most appropriate social exchange mechanism to examine. 
With respect to the effect of positive diagnostic information seeking, one potential 
explanation for the lack of significant results could be insufficient strength of the positive 
diagnostic information seeking manipulation. Compared to the control condition, mean 
responses to the positive diagnostic information seeking manipulation check items were 
only .50 greater in the positive diagnostic information seeking condition. This could be 
due to the well-documented “bad is stronger than good” effect (Baumeister et al., 2001). 
However, given the weaker manipulation, finding any significant results associated with 
positive diagnostic information seeking represents a more conservative test of the 
mediation hypotheses. While positive diagnostic information seeking seemed difficult to 
manipulate experimentally in the lab, a field study might reveal some significant effects 
of positive diagnostic information seeking for several reasons. First, due to the probable 
increased realism and salience of positive diagnostic information seeking (and the job 
search process in general), utilizing a sample of individuals undergoing an actual job 
search with real organizations might increase the strength of the relationship between 
positive diagnostic information seeking and felt obligation. Furthermore, assessing 
positive diagnostic information seeking based on job applicants’ perceptions (something 
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not possible in the lab experiment) might also increase the effect sizes, as they may be a 
more proximal predictor of job applicants’ felt obligation; in this way, there may 
potentially be “noise” between organizations’ actual positive diagnostic information 
seeking behaviors and applicants’ perception of the organizations’ positive diagnostic 
information seeking behaviors. Altogether, a field study may add increased realism and 
theoretical precision in measurement which could increase the possibility of revealing the 
significant effects of positive diagnostic information seeking.  
On the other hand, negative diagnostic information seeking, while significantly 
predicting hiring likelihood perceptions (Hypothesis 4 was supported), was not a 
significant predictor of felt obligation. In contrast to positive diagnostic information 
seeking, which did not exhibit any direct effects on dependent variables, negative 
diagnostic information seeking exhibited some direct effects on the dependent variables 
(specifically, self-imposed decision deadline length and negative word of mouth, p < .05). 
This opens the possibility that other mechanisms could exist that might play a more 
integral part in transmitting the effects of negative diagnostic information seeking. In line 
with this is the observation that the direct relationship between negative diagnostic 
information seeking and self-imposed decision deadline length was opposite to what 
would be expected based on the above theorizing. Rather than responding later, negative 
diagnostic information seeking led subjects to intend to respond earlier to job offers. This 
effect could be due to the possibility that negative diagnostic information seeking was so 
unattractive to applicants that they would be poised to reject a job offer very quickly. Of 
interest though, is the indirect effect of negative diagnostic information seeking on self-
imposed decision deadline length which was in the expected direction. This suggests that 
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the modeling of additional parallel mediators might shed more light on the indirect 
relationship between negative diagnostic information seeking and self-imposed decision 
deadline length. In particular, additional parallel mediators might act in a direct opposite 
of felt obligation. 
 To address the above issues, a field study could be conducted. While providing 
the possibility to examine the causal relationships implied by social exchange theory, 
reduced generalizability and realism (McGrath, 1981) are inherent limitations of 
experimental designs, especially with respect to the proposed mediator of felt obligation. 
A field study where positive diagnostic information seeking is not manipulated but 
instead reported by the job applicant would not only be consistent with social exchange 
theory’s emphasis on perceptions (Homans, 1961) but also allow for the potential to 
observe stronger effects of positive diagnostic information seeking because applicant 
perceptions of organizational actions are likely more proximal to applicant cognitions and 
attitudes (e.g., felt obligation). Following the same logic, stronger effects of negative 
diagnostic information seeking might also be observed which could result in felt 
obligation being shown as a significant mediator. Though the subjects in the experiment 
were told that they would be judged by the organization and potentially rewarded by the 
organization based on their responses, it could be argued that felt obligation is less 
relevant in an experimental design given that the relationship between a hypothetical 
organization and a subject cannot extend beyond these few exchanges. Furthermore, the 
cover story associated with this experimental design urged subjects to imagine that they 
were applying for the organization, which could potentially decrease the realism (and 
hence effect sizes) associated with either positive or negative diagnostic information 
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seeking. Moreover, subjects in this study were students. Though 82.71% of the subjects 
reported that they sought employment opportunities the same semester the experiment 
took place (e.g., full-time job, part-time job, co-op, internship, or development program), 
a sample of active job seekers with actively hiring organizations would lend credence to 
the generalizability of the findings. 
 Finally, extant models of the recruiting process outline three stages in the 
recruiting process - generating applicants, maintaining applicant status, and influencing 
job choices (Barber, 1998). In order to support the notion that the social exchange 
dynamics outlined in this paper are germane to the entire recruiting cycle, an additional 
study, which surveys participants during latter stages of the recruiting cycle, would help 
to examine the phenomena outlined this paper throughout their entire theoretical domain. 
To address the concerns outlined and potentially replicate the above findings, a field 
study was conducted. 
4.2.11 Study 1 exploratory analyses 
 An exploratory data analysis was conducted to ascertain the effect of providing 
subjects with both positive and negative diagnostic information seeking together. An 
additive effects perspective grounded in the theoretical framework proposed might 
suggest that a combination of both positive and negative diagnostic information seeking 
together could potentially result in null effects. At the same time, a “bad is stronger than 
good” perspective (Baumeister et al., 2001) might suggest that combining both positive 
and negative diagnostic information seeking together (to equal extents) could actually 
result in net lower perceptions of felt obligation and hiring likelihood as the negative 
effects of negative diagnostic information seeking could overpower the positive effects of 
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positive diagnostic information seeking. Given these two competing explanations, these 
exploratory hypotheses mirror the formal hypotheses presented in the main data analysis 
except there are no predictions regarding the direction of potential effects. The 
exploratory analyses were conducted utilizing the same statistical techniques in the main 
analyses with the same controls (i.e., positive affect, negative affect, and prestige).  
Results are summarized in Appendix B.  Descriptive statistics and correlations are 
presented in Appendix C and regression results for each exploratory hypothesis are 
presented in Appendix D through Appendix I. As a robustness check, a summary of 
results without control variables is also presented in Appendix B. Overall, only one 
relationship was significant (the negative relationship between the positive and negative 
diagnostic information seeking manipulation and hiring likelihood perceptions). This 
finding is consistent with a “bad is stronger than good” (Baumeister et al., 2001) 
perspective of diagnostic information seeking. However, this result was not robust to the 
removal of control variables, so caution should be heeded in interpreting the results and 
future research may attempt to further evidence any presence of a “bad is stronger than 
good” (Baumeister et al., 2001) effect associated with the combination of both positive 
and negative diagnostic information seeking. 
4.3 Study 2: Field Study 
4.3.1 Field site and participants  
  Participants for the field study were recruited through a university career services 
center. The career services center serves as the official body in charge of organizing on-
campus interviews for all students at the university. 71 organizations interviewed through 
the career services center during the data collection period and conducted over 1,400 
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interviews. All students contacted had completed at least one on-campus interview. A 
recruitment flyer and initial survey were sent via e-mail the week following on-campus 
interviews with various organizations. Participants were instructed to fill out the below 
measures with respect to the most recent organization they interviewed with under the 
condition that they were still pursing employment with that organization. A second 
survey was sent to participants a week after and a final survey was sent to participants 
after the close of the semester. The vast majority of participants (75.5%) were still in a 
recruiting relationship with the organization by the time of the second survey (i.e., have 
not been rejected from the organization and are still pursuing a job with the organization). 
In exchange for completing each survey, individuals were entered into a raffle drawing 
for various prizes and were given a $5 gift card for completion of all three surveys. Due 
to an insufficient response rate on the final survey, only the first two surveys were 
utilized; this represented 114 of 949 (12.01%) potential participants. The final sample had 
the following characteristics: 45.6% female; average age of 22.60 (s.d. = 3.87); 49.12% 
Caucasian, 3.51% Black, 5.26% Hispanic, 39.47% Asian, and 2.63% Other; 39.47% were 
employed either part-time or full-time; and on average subjects had 2.63 months of work 
experience relevant to the job they were applying for (s.d. = 1.58). 
4.3.2 Measures 
 Positive diagnostic information seeking. Positive diagnostic information 
seeking was assessed on the first survey utilizing the manipulation check measure from 
Study 1 with the stem of the measure changed to the following ( = .89): 
Based on your experiences with the organization thus far, please indicate the extent to 
which you agree with the statements below. 
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 Negative diagnostic information seeking. Negative diagnostic information 
seeking was assessed on the first survey utilizing the manipulation check measure from 
Study 1 with the stem of the measure changed to the following ( = .92): 
Based on your experiences with the organization thus far, please indicate the extent to 
which you agree with the statements below. 
 Felt obligation. Felt obligation was assessed on the second survey with the same 
measure as Study 1 ( = .84). 
 Hiring likelihood. Hiring likelihood was assessed on the first survey with the 
same measure as Study 1 ( = .87). 
 Self-imposed decision deadlines. The establishment and length of self-imposed 
decision deadlines was assessed on the second survey with the same measures as Study 1. 
 Positive word of mouth. Positive word of mouth was assessed on the second 
survey utilizing the same scale as Study 1 adapted to focus on self-reports of past 
behavior ( = .91):  
To what extent have you… 
1. Said positive things about the organization to others. 
2. Recommended the organization to others. 
3. Recommended the organization to someone else who sought your advice. 
4. Spent time telling people you talk to positive things about the organization. 
5. Spent time recommending the organization as an employer to family, friends, or 
acquaintances. 
 Faking. Prior research suggests that deviant behavior, such as faking, can be 
measured validly by self-report (e.g., Ones et al., 1993) because individuals that engage 
in these actions likely believe that such behaviors are commonplace (American 
Psychological Association, 1991; Murphy, 1993) and often find it difficult to anticipate 
how individuals that do not engage in these behaviors would actually respond to self-
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report items (Cunningham, Wong, & Barbee, 1994). To serve as a complement to the 
behavioral measure in Study 1, faking was measured utilizing the four item likert-type 
scale developed by Levashina and Campion (2009) on the second survey ( = .89). 
Based on your interactions with the organization, please indicate the extent to which 
you’ve engaged in the following actions: 
1. I enhanced my fit with the job in terms of attitudes, values, or beliefs. 
2. I inflated the fit between my values and goals and the values and goals of the 
organization 
3. I inflated the fit between my credentials and the needs of the organization. 
4. I tried to use information about the company to make my answers sound like I 
was a better fit than I actually was. 
4.3.3 Control variables 
 Following similar logic outlined in Study 1, prestige (Highhouse et al., 2003) was 
entered as a control as it represents a potential alternative mediator. Because this data 
collection effort occurred over a period of a week, positive and negative affect were not 
necessary controls as in Study 1. However, additional controls were necessary for this 
study given that it occurred in a field setting. Specifically, participant characteristics such 
as ethnicity (coded 0 = Caucasian, 1 = other), GPA (out of four points), major, job search 
effort (Wanberg, Zhu, & Van Hooft, 2010), progress with the focal organization (as a 
percentage of the number of interviews they have been invited to compared to the total 
number of interviews for the organization), and job type (coded 0 = full-time 
employment, 1 = other) were controlled for as these factors may affect felt obligation 
perceptions and the dependent variables of interest. In particular, given that social 
exchange addresses, in part, the symbolic meaning behind actions rather than their 
instrumental values, controlling for the above factors, which might impact applicant 
outcomes, provides results that emphasize organizational actions over and above 
outcomes. 
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4.3.4 Preliminary analyses 
 Confirmatory factor analysis. A CFA was completed on the positive and 
negative diagnostic information seeking, hiring likelihood, felt obligation, positive word 
of mouth, and faking variables in the lavaan package (Rosseel, 2012) for the R 
environment (R Development Core Team, 2015). The establishment of self-imposed 
decision deadlines and the length of self-imposed decision deadlines were excluded based 
on suggestions that two indicators is the minimum amount required for a factor (Kline, 
2015). As would be expected, the smaller sample size unfavorably hampered the fit 
indices (Tanaka, 1987), yet after random item parceling, a six-factor structure containing 
positive diagnostic information seeking, negative diagnostic information seeking, hiring 
likelihood, felt obligation, positive word of mouth, and negative word of mouth fit the 
data adequately (χ2 = 309.69 [df = 194], p < 0.01; CFI = .93; SRMR = .08) and 
significantly better than a five-factor model combining positive and negative diagnostic 
information seeking (χ2 = 558.26 [df = 199], p < 0.01; CFI = .77; SRMR = .12); a four-
factor model combining positive and negative diagnostic information seeking and 
combining hiring likelihood and felt obligation (χ2 = 757.55 [df = 203], p < 0.01; CFI = 
.64; SRMR = .15); a three-factor model combining positive and negative diagnostic 
information seeking, hiring likelihood and felt obligation, and positive word of mouth 
and faking (χ2 = 919.84 [df = 206], p < 0.01; CFI = .54; SRMR = .17); a two-factor 
model combining (1) positive and negative diagnostic information seeking, hiring 
likelihood, and felt obligation and (2) positive word of mouth and faking (χ2 = 1097.04 
[df = 208], p < 0.01; CFI = .42; SRMR = .17); and a one-factor model containing all 
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variables (χ2 = 1272.24 [df = 209], p < 0.01; CFI = .31; SRMR = .18). Therefore, the data 
provided the most support for a six factor model which evidences discriminant validity. 
4.3.5 Results 
 Descriptive statistics are displayed in Table 11.
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Table 11 
Means, standard deviations, and correlations (Study 2)eans, standard deviations, and correlations (Study 2)
M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1. Ethnicity1 0.51 0.50 ---
2. GPA 3.53 0.38 -.12 ---
3. Engineering major2 0.51 0.50 -.02 -.21* ---
4 Computer science major3 0.23 0.42 .28** -.03 -.55** ---
5. Other major4 0.02 0.13 .13 .07 -.14 -.07 ---
6. Job search effort 3.32 0.78 -.04 -.04 -.17 .00 -.11 ---
7. Job progress 0.71 0.32 -.09 .11 .00 .01 -.15 .28** ---
8 Non-full-time employment5 0.52 0.50 .14 .06 .07 .11 -.01 .00 .00 ---
9 Prestige 3.86 0.77 -.37** .08 -.01 -.23* -.15 .38** .04 -.04 ---
10. Positive diagnostic info seeking 3.79 0.79 -.19* -.01 .00 -.17 -.11 .32** .02 .05 .58** ---
11. Negative diagnostic info seeking 2.28 0.96 .07 -.12 -.06 .22* -.04 .07 .05 -.04 -.27** -.23* ---
12. Hiring likelihood 3.17 0.81 -.15 -.09 -.07 -.08 -.07 .25** .17 -.09 .33** .42** -.09 ---
13. Felt obligation 3.64 0.69 -.04 .06 .10 -.11 -.03 .21* .13 .23* .31** .31** -.07 .24* ---
14. Self-imposed decision deadline 68.63 29.14 .01 .02 .03 -.02 -.10 .16 -.02 .21* .14 .32** -.12 .12 .19* ---
15. Self-imposed decision deadline length 4.25 2.06 -.04 .04 -.19* .11 -.08 .17 -.02 .07 .15 .14 -.20* .10 .07 .53** ---
16. Positive word of mouth 2.89 0.95 -.10 .05 -.14 -.07 .00 .58** .18 .05 .59** .44** .02 .38** .29** .10 .17 ---
17. Faking 2.65 0.96 .21* -.14 -.08 -.01 .14 .19* -.01 .06 -.06 .09 .26** .03 -.08 .01 .07 .20*
Note:  N = 114.
1Dummy Variable (1 = Minority, 0 = Caucasian)
2Dummy Variable (1 = Engineering major, 0 = Business major)
3Dummy Variable (1 = Computer science major, 0 = Business major)
4Dummy Variable (1 = Other major, 0 = Business major)
5Dummy Variable (1 = Not seeking full-time employment, 0 = Seeking full-time employment)




Similar to Study 1, Hypotheses 1-7b were tested utilizing multiple regression 
analysis in SPSS 22.0. After inputting the control variables in Model 1 of Table 12, 
Model 2 shows the results of the test of Hypothesis 1 which argues for a positive 
relationship between positive diagnostic information seeking and felt obligation toward 
the organization. Hypothesis 1 was not supported (β = .17, p > .05). Hypothesis 2 posited 
a similar positive relationship between positive diagnostic information seeking and 
perceptions of hiring likelihood. As outlined in Model 5 of Table 12, Hypothesis 2 was 
supported (β = .33, p < .01). 
 Hypotheses 3 and 4 proposed a negative relationship between both negative 
diagnostic information seeking and felt obligation and perceptions of hiring likelihood. 
Based on Model 2 of Table 12, Hypothesis 3 was not supported, as there was not a 
significant relationship between negative diagnostic information seeking and felt 
obligation (β = .05, p > .05). Hypothesis 4 was also not supported, as Model 5 of Table 
12 shows a non-significant relationship between negative diagnostic information seeking 
and perceptions of hiring likelihood (β = -.01, p > .05). 
 Hypothesis 5a proposes a moderating effect of hiring likelihood perceptions on 
the relationship between positive diagnostic information seeking and felt obligation. 
Model 3 of Table 12 evidences a significant moderating effect of hiring likelihood 
perceptions (β = -.23, p < .05) but in the reverse direction (see Figure 3). Thus, 
Hypothesis 5a was not supported. Hypothesis 5b, which proposes a moderating effect of 
hiring likelihood perceptions on the relationship between negative diagnostic information 
seeking and felt obligation was not supported (β = -.14, p > .05).
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Table 12 
Summary of regression results on felt obligation (Study 2)
   
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Variable B SE(B ) β B SE(B ) β B SE(B ) β B SE(B ) β B SE(B ) β
Constant 1.65* 0.77 1.88* 0.79 2.07* 0.80 2.89** 0.91 2.30* 0.96
Controls
Ethnicity1 0.07 0.14 0.05 0.07 0.14 0.05 0.07 0.14 0.05 -0.04 0.17 -0.02 -0.05 0.16 -0.03
GPA 0.08 0.17 0.04 0.10 0.17 0.06 0.13 0.17 0.07 -0.34† 0.20 -0.16† -0.29 0.20 -0.14
Engineering major2 0.16 0.17 0.11 0.16 0.17 0.12 0.18 0.16 0.13 -0.21 0.20 -0.13 -0.18 0.19 -0.11
Computer science major3 -0.03 0.20 -0.02 -0.02 0.20 -0.01 -0.06 0.20 -0.04 -0.15 0.24 -0.08 -0.09 0.23 -0.05
Other major4 0.26 0.50 0.05 0.29 0.50 0.06 0.21 0.48 0.04 -0.04 0.59 -0.01 0.04 0.57 0.01
Job search effort 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.11 0.07 0.03 0.11 0.03
Job progress 0.21 0.21 0.10 0.22 0.20 0.10 0.08 0.21 0.04 0.40 0.24 0.16 0.43† 0.24 0.17†
Non-full-time employment5 0.31* 0.13 0.23* 0.30* 0.13 0.22* 0.31* 0.12 0.23* -0.08 0.15 -0.05 -0.12 0.14 -0.08
Prestige 0.26** 0.10 0.29** 0.20† 0.11 0.22† 0.16 0.11 0.18 0.30** 0.11 0.28** 0.11 0.13 0.10
Predictors
Positive diagnostic information seeking 0.15 0.10 0.17 0.05 0.10 0.06 0.34** 0.11 .33**
Negative diagnostic information seeking 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.04 -0.01 0.08 -0.01
Hiring likelihood 0.15 0.08 0.18
Interactions
Positive diagnostic information seeking X hiring likelihood -0.23* 0.09 -0.23*
Negative diagnostic information seeking X hiring likelihood -0.11 0.07 -0.14
R .44* .46* .53* .42* .50**
R 2 .19* .21* .28* .18* .25**
∆R 2 .02 .07* .07**
Adjusted R 2 .12 .12 .18 0.10 0.16
Note:  N  = 114. 
1Dummy Variable (1 = Minority, 0 = Caucasian)
2Dummy Variable (1 = Engineering major, 0 = Business major)
3Dummy Variable (1 = Computer science major, 0 = Business major)
4Dummy Variable (1 = Other major, 0 = Business major)
5Dummy Variable (1 = Not seeking full-time employment, 0 = Seeking full-time employment)
 † p ≤ .10. * p ≤ .05. ** p ≤ .01. 






























Hypothesis 6a posits a positive relationship between felt obligation toward the 
organization and the establishment of self-imposed decision deadlines while Hypothesis 
6b suggests a positive relationship between felt obligation toward the organization and 
the length of self-imposed decision deadlines. After inputting the control variables in 
Model 1 and the direct effects of positive and negative diagnostic information seeking in 
Model 2, Hypothesis 6a (β = .08, p > .05; see Model 3 of Table 13) and 6b (β = .03, p > 
.05; see Model 6 of Table 13) were not supported. 
After inputting relevant controls and the direct effects of positive and negative 
diagnostic information seeking, the positive relationship between felt obligation and 
positive word of mouth was not significant (β = .04, p > .05, see Model 3 of Table 14). 
Thus, Hypothesis 7a was not supported. 
Hypothesis 8 proposes a negative relationship between felt obligation and faking. 
After controlling for relevant variables and positive and negative diagnostic information 
seeking, Hypothesis 8 was not supported (β = -.16, p > .05; see Model 6 of Table 14). 
 Hypotheses 9a, 9b, 9c, and 9e propose that felt obligation mediates the indirect 
effects of positive diagnostic information seeking on the dependent variables. Table 15 
displays the results of four tests of indirect effects utilizing 95% bootstrapped confidence 
intervals (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) with the PROCESS macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2013). 
After controlling for the potential alternative mechanisms of prestige and relevant 
controls as covariates, Hypotheses 9a, 9b, 9c, and 9e were not supported (i.e., all 95% 
bootstrapped confidence intervals contain zero). However, Hypothesis 9e was marginally 
significant as the 90% bootstrapped confidence interval did not contain zero (-.17, -.003). 
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Table 13 






Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Variable B SE(B ) β B SE(B ) β B SE(B ) β B SE(B ) β B SE(B ) β B SE(B ) β
Constant 0.30 0.34 0.18 0.36 0.14 0.37 2.73 2.44 4.34† 2.61 4.24 0.27
Controls
Ethnicity1 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.02 -0.05 0.44 -0.01 -0.14 0.44 -0.04 -0.15 0.44 -0.04
GPA 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.54 0.00 -0.06 0.54 -0.01 -0.07 0.54 -0.01
Engineering major2 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.16 0.07 0.03 -0.27 0.53 -0.18 -0.61 0.52 -0.16 -0.66 0.53 -0.16
Computer science major3 -0.02 0.09 -0.03 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.10 0.63 0.02 0.35 0.63 0.07 0.35 0.64 0.07
Other major4 -0.19 0.22 -0.09 -0.17 0.22 -0.08 -0.18 0.22 -0.08 -1.32 1.58 -0.08 -1.39 1.56 -0.09 -1.41 1.57 -0.09
Job search effort 0.05 0.04 0.14 0.05 0.04 0.13 0.05 0.04 0.12 0.29 0.29 0.11 0.40 0.30 0.15 0.39 0.30 0.15
Job progress -0.07 0.09 -0.08 -0.06 0.09 -0.07 -0.07 0.09 -0.08 -0.43 0.65 -0.07 -0.43 0.64 -0.07 -0.45 0.65 -0.07
Non-full-time employment5 0.12* 0.06 0.21* 0.10† 0.06 0.18† 0.09 0.06 0.16 0.36 0.40 0.09 0.30 0.39 0.07 0.27 0.41 0.07
Prestige 0.03 0.04 0.09 -0.04 0.05 -0.10 -0.05 0.05 -0.12 0.27 0.30 0.10 0.03 0.35 0.01 0.01 0.36 0.00
IVs
Positive diagnostic information seeking 0.12** 0.04 0.32** 0.11** 0.04 0.30** 0.07 0.30 0.03 0.06 0.31 0.02
Negative diagnostic information seeking -0.03 0.03 -0.08 -0.03 0.03 -0.09 -0.48* 0.22 0.22* -0.48* 0.22 -0.22*
Mediator
Felt Obligation 0.03 0.04 0.08 0.08 0.31 0.03
R .30 .41† .41† .29 .36 .36
R 2 .09 .16† .17† .08 .13 .13
∆R 2 .04† .00
Adjusted R 2 .01 .07 .07 .01 .03 .02
Note:  N  = 114. 
1Dummy Variable (1 = Minority, 0 = Caucasian)
2Dummy Variable (1 = Engineering major, 0 = Business major)
3Dummy Variable (1 = Computer science major, 0 = Business major)
4Dummy Variable (1 = Other major, 0 = Business major)
5Dummy Variable (1 = Not seeking full-time employment, 0 = Seeking full-time employment)
 † p ≤ .10. * p ≤ .05. ** p ≤ .01. 
Self-Imposed Decision Self-Imposed Deadline Length Self-Imposed Deadline LengthSelf-Imposed DecisionSelf-Imposed Decision
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Table 14 
Summary of regression results on positive word of mouth and faking (Study 2)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Variable B SE(B ) β B SE(B ) β B SE(B ) β B SE(B ) β B SE(B ) β B SE(B ) β
Constant -1.16 0.81 -2.00** 0.86 -2.06* 0.88 3.58** 1.10 2.19† 1.15 2.46* 1.15
Controls
Ethnicity1 0.16 0.15 0.08 0.19 0.15 0.10 0.18 0.15 0.10 0.36† 0.20 0.19† 0.42* 0.19 0.22* 0.43* 0.19 0.23*
GPA 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.05 0.18 0.02 0.04 0.18 0.02 -0.39 0.24 -0.16 -0.32 0.24 -0.13 -0.30 0.23 -0.12
Engineering major2 -0.13 0.18 -0.07 -0.14 0.17 -0.08 -0.15 0.17 -0.08 -0.32 0.24 -0.17 -0.35 0.23 -0.18 -0.31 0.23 -0.17
Computer science major3 -0.05 0.21 -0.02 -0.10 0.21 -0.04 -0.10 0.21 -0.04 -0.42 0.28 -0.19 -0.52† 0.28 -0.23† 0.52† 0.28 -0.23†
Other major4 0.76 0.53 0.11 0.82 0.52 0.11 0.80 0.52 0.11 0.69 0.71 0.10 0.78 0.68 0.11 0.85 0.68 0.12
Job search effort 0.45** 0.10 0.37** 0.39** 0.10 0.33** 0.39** 0.10 0.32** 0.25† 0.13 0.21† 0.16 0.13 0.13 0.18 0.13 0.14
Job progress 0.23 0.22 0.08 0.24 0.21 0.08 0.23 0.22 0.08 -0.05 0.29 -0.02 -0.03 0.28 -0.01 0.02 0.28 0.01
Non-full-time employment5 0.12 0.13 0.07 0.12 0.13 0.07 0.11 0.13 0.06 0.14 0.18 0.07 0.14 0.17 0.08 0.21 0.18 0.11
Prestige 0.60** 0.10 0.49** 0.59** 0.12 0.48** 0.58** 0.12 0.47** -0.10 0.14 -0.08 -0.08 0.15 -0.07 -0.04 0.16 -0.03
IVs
Positive diagnostic information seeking 0.14 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.10 0.11 0.20 0.13 0.16 0.23† 0.13 0.19†
Negative diagnostic information seeking 0.16* 0.07 0.16* 0.16* 0.07 0.16* 0.28** 0.10 0.28** 0.29** 0.10 0.29**
Mediator
Felt Obligation 0.05 0.10 0.04 -0.22 0.14 -0.16
R .72** .74** .74** .37† .47** .49**
R 2 .52** .55** .55** .14† .22** .24**
∆R 2 .03* 0.00 .08** .02
Adjusted R 2 .48 .50 .50 .07 .13 .15
Note:  N  = 114. 
1Dummy Variable (1 = Minority, 0 = Caucasian)
2Dummy Variable (1 = Engineering major, 0 = Business major)
3Dummy Variable (1 = Computer science major, 0 = Business major)
4Dummy Variable (1 = Other major, 0 = Business major)
5Dummy Variable (1 = Not seeking full-time employment, 0 = Seeking full-time employment)
 † p ≤ .10. * p ≤ .05. ** p ≤ .01. 
Positive Word of Mouth Positive Word of Mouth Positive Word of Mouth Faking Faking Faking
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Table 15 
Unstandardized indirect effect of positive diagnostic information seeking (through 
felt obligation) and the associated 95% confidence intervals (Study 2)
   
Thus, there is no support for the mediating role of felt obligation in the indirect 
relationship between positive diagnostic information seeking and: the establishment of 
self-imposed decision deadlines, the length of self-imposed decision deadlines, positive 
word of mouth, and faking.  
 Hypotheses 10a, 10b, 10c, and 10e propose the mediating role of felt obligation in 
the indirect effect between negative diagnostic information seeking and the dependent 
variables. These hypotheses were tested in the same way as Hypotheses 9a, 9b, 9c, and 
9e. Table 16 displays the results of these four tests of indirect effects. All of the 95% 
bootstrapped confidence intervals contain zero, thus, Hypotheses 10a, 10b, 10c, and 10e 
were not supported.  
Table 16 
Unstandardized indirect effect of negative diagnostic information seeking (through felt 
obligation) and the associated 95% confidence intervals (Study 2)
  
 Hypotheses 11a, 11b, 11c, and 11e propose a moderated mediation model wherein 
the mediating role of felt obligation in the relationship between positive diagnostic 
information seeking and the dependent variables is a process that is contingent upon 
levels of hiring likelihood perceptions. Table 17 shows the results of these analyses 





Positive Word of 
Mouth Faking
Positive diagnostic information seeking .01 .02 .01 -0.05†
(-.01 .03) (-.13, .19) (-.03, .08) (-.16, .00)
Note:  N  = 114. 
Controls (mediator): prestige
Controls (independent variable): negative diagnostic information seeking, ethnicity, GPA, major, job search effort, job progress, non-full-time employment





Positive Word of 
Mouth Faking
Negative diagnostic information seeking .00 .00 .00 .00
(-.01, .01) (-.04, .05) (-.01, .02) (-.04, .03)
Note:  N  = 114. 
Controls (mediator): prestige
Controls (independent variable): positive diagnostic information seeking, ethnicity, GPA, major, job search effort, job progress, non-full-time employment
 † p ≤ .10. * p ≤ .05. ** p ≤ .01. 
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PROCESS macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2013). In sum, these hypotheses were not supported; 
the 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals for the index of moderated mediation (Hayes, 
2013) all contained zero. However, the 90% bootstrapped confidence interval associated 
with the index of moderated mediation for Hypothesis 11e, predicting faking, was 
marginally significant (.001, .14). 
Table 17 
Index of moderated mediation and the associated 95% confidence intervals (Study 
2) 
Moderating effect of hiring likelihood perceptions on the effect of positive diagnostic 
information seeking through felt obligation 
 
 Similarly, Hypotheses 12a, 12b, 12c, and 12e propose a moderated mediation 
model wherein the mediating role of felt obligation in the relationship between negative 
diagnostic information seeking and the dependent variables is a process that is contingent 
upon levels of hiring likelihood perceptions. Results displayed in Table 18 show that 
these hypotheses were not supported since the 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals for 
the index of moderated mediation all contained zero. 
Table 18 
Index of moderated mediation and the associated 95% confidence intervals (Study 
2) 
Moderating effect of hiring likelihood perceptions on the effect of negative 
diagnostic information seeking through felt obligation 
 
Self-Imposed Deadline Self-Imposed Deadline Length
Positive Word of 
Mouth Faking
Positive diagnostic information seeking -.01 -.02 -.01 .05†
(-.03, .01) (-.21, .13) (-.08, .04) (-.01, .15)
Note:  N  = 114
Controls (mediator): prestige
Controls (independent variable): negative diagnostic information seeking, ethnicity, GPA, major, job search effort, job progress, non-full-time employment
 † p ≤ .10. * p ≤ .05. ** p ≤ .01. 
Self-Imposed Deadline Self-Imposed Deadline Length
Positive Word of 
Mouth Faking
Negative diagnostic information seeking .00 -.01 .00 .01
(-.02, .00) (-.11, .04) (-.04, .01) (-.02, .09)
Note:  N  = 114
Controls (mediator): prestige
Controls (independent variable): positive diagnostic information seeking, ethnicity, GPA, major, job search effort, job progress, non-full-time employment
 † p ≤ .10. * p ≤ .05. ** p ≤ .01. 
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4.3.6 Study 2 discussion and limitations 
 Hypotheses were generally not supported in this study. While the field setting of 
this study could have potentially increased confidence in the generalizability of the 
findings from Study 1, the significant effects that were found in Study 1 were not 
replicated in Study 2. Interestingly, the reverse case is also true as the significant effects 
found in Study 2 were not present in Study 1. 
 While few hypotheses were supported, Study 2 did evidence a significant effect of 
positive diagnostic information seeking on hiring likelihood perceptions. Though caution 
should be exercised in interpreting this effect given that it was not significant in Study 1, 
the relationship between positive diagnostic information seeking and hiring likelihood 
perceptions is consistent with theoretical work dealing with opportunities to perform 
(Ford et al., 1992). Moreover, the test of Hypothesis 5a (Figure 3) yielded an interesting 
significant moderation effect that was in a direction opposite to what was hypothesized. 
Though the main effects were not significant, this significant interaction effect suggests 
that hiring likelihood perceptions might change the nature of the relationship between 
positive diagnostic information seeking and felt obligation. While simple slopes analyses 
conducted at one standard deviation above and below the mean were not significant, the 
significance of the interaction term implies that at lower levels of hiring likelihood 
perceptions, positive diagnostic information seeking may be more likely to engender felt 
obligation toward the organization while at higher levels of hiring likelihood perceptions, 
positive diagnostic information seeking may be less likely to increase felt obligation. 
Though contrary to initial theorizing, a possible explanation for this moderating effect 
could stem from theoretical underpinnings of social exchange theory. In particular, social 
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exchange theory emphasizes the voluntariness of exchange relationships (Blau, 1964). It 
might be that hiring likelihood perceptions could be related to notions that the 
organization “needs” the employee, which undermines the voluntariness of benefits 
provided (i.e., positive diagnostic information seeking). For example, in tight labor 
markets, organizations might offer a whole host of benefits to job candidates in order to 
entice them to join the organization (Rynes & Barber, 1990), but job applicants might 
perceive that organizations are only temporarily offering benefits to applicants and 
cannot be relied upon to voluntarily offer benefits over a longer-term; in turn, this may 
undermine the obligation felt by job candidates. Perhaps a broader issue, that could 
explain the results of this study, stems from the nature of felt obligation within the 
recruiting context. While felt obligation has been a central construct in social exchange 
theory since its inception (Blau, 1964), the measure utilized in Study 1 and 2 was 
developed within the context of an existent organization-employee relationship 
(Eisenberger et al., 2001). It is possible that the nature of the roles and expectations of a 
job applicant and hiring organization are not precisely the same as that of an employee 
and organization; this might explain the general lack of significance surrounding the 
mediating role of felt obligation. As a result, job applicants may have difficulty 
accurately assessing felt obligation (at least the particular operationalization utilized), 
since the construct may only become salient in certain relationships, contexts, or points in 
time. Future research might employ a construct that is more universal in judgment. For 
example, fairness perceptions may be a more salient and clearly understood construct that 
might act as a social exchange mediator. 
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A supplementary perspective to the above interaction finding might simply be that 
a job applicant that has a high likelihood of receiving a job offer need not reciprocate 
benefits received. In this sense, a relationship based on a two-way exchange of resources 
is not necessary because the job applicant might be able to achieve a one-way receipt of 
benefits without reciprocation, which could help him/her maximize self-interests. In fact, 
an organization may be providing benefits without the need for information-based 
reciprocation because they are hoping for reciprocation in other forms, such as an 
acceptance of a job offer or simply applying to the job. 
 Finally, while Study 2 provided the potential to examine the generalizability of 
findings in Study 1 by utilizing a field-based design, rather than an experimental design, 
both studies still utilize a student population. Though all participants in this sample were 
actively looking for employment opportunities during the same semester that this study 
was conducted, and a wide variety of job seekers all hold many similar job search goals 
(Boswell et al., 2012), an examination of other types of job seekers (e.g., unemployed 
individuals, full-time employees, part-time employees, etc.) might alleviate some of the 
inherent concerns related to generalizability due to a student sample. 
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CHAPTER 5 




  Figure 1 displays the entire theoretical model which suggests an exchange of 
social benefits and costs in the staffing process that occurs through felt obligation. As a 
whole instance of social exchange (wherein a benefit or cost is received, elicits felt 
obligation, and results in reciprocation), both the lab and field study together provide 
little support for the particular hypotheses forwarded. Specifically, only one hypothesis 
relating to indirect effects through felt obligation was supported in Study 1 (i.e., the 
indirect effect of positive diagnostic information seeking on the length of self-imposed 
decision deadlines through felt obligation) and this effect failed to replicate in Study 2. 
With this in mind, the potential theoretical implications outlined below are limited and 
should be interpreted with caution. However, the theoretical framework proposed 
throughout this paper may still potentially provide a base for future researchers to build 
upon, especially if another, more theoretically sound, mediator of social exchange (in lieu 
of felt obligation) is modeled—a point discussed in the future research directions below. 
5.1 Theoretical Implications 
The current paper presents an integrated social exchange model grounded in the 
exchange of information-based benefits and costs between a hiring organization and job 
applicant. In line with social exchange theory, this paper emphasizes the importance of 
understanding information-related actions in recruiting and selection contexts as 
symbolic activities that impact applicant reactions. Furthermore, social exchange theory 
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has the potential to complement the predominant theoretical lens in the recruiting 
literature, signaling theory (Turban, 2001; Walker et al., 2012), by underscoring the fact 
that “signals” sent by hiring organizations also have an effect on the pattern of interaction 
between these two parties during the staffing process, which occurs even before an 
employee-organization relationship is established. Relatedly, social exchange theory 
suggests that job applicant reactions to organization recruiting and selection behavior 
likely include outcomes that extend beyond job choice decisions (e.g., job pursuit and 
offer acceptance). By integrating the notion of like-kind exchanges into the present 
model, the resultant hypotheses benefit from an increase in the theoretical precision of the 
types of outcomes that can be expected by hiring organizations when they provide 
information-based benefits to job applicants (i.e., information-based reciprocation can be 
expected from the provision of information-based benefits). In addition, a social 
exchange-based model allows for the study of recruiting and selection from the 
perspective of both the job applicant and the hiring organization, and not merely one or 
the other (cf. Breaugh & Starke, 2000; Ehrhart & Ziegert, 2005), as social exchange is 
inherently a two-party process. Finally, social exchange theory provides a temporal and 
dynamic view of recruiting and selection phenomena. In contrast to signaling or brand 
equity perspectives (Collins & Han, 2004), which provide snapshots of applicant 
reactions to certain organizational behavior, social exchange theory provides insight on 
the nature and extent of subsequent organization and applicant interactions as they 
exchange resources across time and contexts. 
 An additional contribution of this work is the detailing of how and why an 
organization’s information seeking strategies might lead to different levels of applicant 
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self-imposed decision deadlines, positive word of mouth, negative word of mouth, and 
faking by drawing on a central construct in social exchange theory, felt obligation, that 
drives reciprocation toward the organization (Eisenberger et al., 2001). The present 
studies also represent the initial examination of this construct within the context of 
recruitment and selection. By doing so, this study extends the notion of obligation from 
being embedded in existing employee-organization relationships to potentially shorter 
relationships between job candidates and hiring organizations. Indeed in Study 1, felt 
obligation was a significant predictor of both the length of self-imposed decision 
deadlines and positive word of mouth. As a result, this paper theorizes on and finds some 
support for the potential that job applicant-hiring organization relationships are 
sufficiently long-term enough for social exchange dynamics (e.g., felt obligation) to be 
relevant in predicting behavior and attitudes. 
In addition, this paper meaningfully extends the work of prior researchers (e.g., 
Sackett, 1982) by building a theory of diagnostic information seeking. Whereas positive 
or negative intentioned interview questioning focused on the strategies interviewers use 
to confirm or disconfirm their a priori beliefs about candidates, the present paper shifts 
focus to the job applicant and places emphasis on applicant perceptions and reactions and 
examines these phenomena in the broader course of recruiting and selection cycles in 
general, not just the interview. Results from Study 1 and 2 empirically highlight the 
potential of this contribution. For example, negative diagnostic information seeking was a 
marginally significant predictor of hiring likelihood perceptions in Study 1, which in turn 
has been shown to be related to applicant attraction on a meta-analytic basis (Chapman et 
al., 2005). Similarly, positive diagnostic information seeking displayed significant 
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indirect relationships with the length of self-imposed decision deadlines and a marginally 
significant indirect effect on positive word of mouth (Study 1). Furthermore, positive 
diagnostic information seeking had a significant effect on hiring likelihood perceptions in 
Study 2. Given that the majority of the significant relationships found in the studies were 
in the expected direction, the results obtained from the studies together demonstrate the 
potential impact that positive and negative diagnostic information seeking might have on 
important recruiting outcomes. This effort fits well with the selection literature’s more 
recent trend to carefully consider applicant reactions to selection procedures in addition 
to the validity of the selection procedures themselves (Hausknecht et al., 2004). Given the 
relative dearth of research since Sackett’s (1979) theorizing on positive and negative 
intentioned interview questions, the present paper integrates and extends prior work in 
the selection literature by examining several potentially relevant job applicant reactions.  
Finally, the proposed model further integrates the recruitment and selection 
literatures by outlining the potential effects associated with a critical component of 
selection, information seeking, and integrating the examination of this selection behavior 
with the recruiting literature by considering outcomes relevant to recruitment efforts (e.g., 
word of mouth). As prior scholars have noted, recruitment and selection activities do not 
act in isolation (Rynes, 1989) and theoretical models that examine both phenomenon 
simultaneously are more poised to capture the richness and interrelatedness associated 
with a phenomenon as complex as staffing. By demonstrating that both positive and 
negative information seeking by the organization can impact dependent variables 
traditionally thought of as recruitment outcomes, this paper bridges the gap between the 
99 
traditionally separate, but conceptually and practically related, fields of recruitment and 
selection (Bangerter et al., 2012). 
5.2 Practical Implications 
Beyond theoretical contributions, the model and results presented in this paper 
carry several points of practical and actionable advice to managers. First, the elucidation 
of positive and negative diagnostic information seeking provides a classification system 
for organizations to categorize their information seeking strategies and behaviors. By 
identifying these specific practices, organizations may be well poised to assess their 
current selection systems to estimate the extent to which they may reap potential 
beneficial (or minimize detrimental) information-based outcomes. Though many of the 
proposed hypotheses were not supported, the indirect and direct effects that were 
supported in Study 1 and 2 carry important implications for organizations. For example, 
results from Study 1 suggest that negative diagnostic information seeking exhibits 
significant direct effects on negative word of mouth and the length of self-imposed 
decision deadlines. This same effect is replicated for self-imposed decision deadline 
length in Study 2. In addition, Study 2 demonstrates a significant direct effect of negative 
diagnostic information seeing on faking. Moreover, marginally significant effects were 
found for negative diagnostic information seeking on faking in Study 1. The consistent 
effect of negative diagnostic information seeking on faking suggests that perhaps 
individuals engage in faking to avoid negative consequences but might be more hesitant 
to violate ethical norms to gain benefits. Though they were not hypothesized on an a 
priori basis, these results suggest that organizations should be careful when engaging in 
negative diagnostic information seeking if they desire to minimize potential detrimental 
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effects and maximize potential information-based benefits. For example, during the 
pursuit of a particularly desirable candidate, organizations are likely aware that they 
should treat him/her with respect and warmth but the research presented here suggests 
that organizations need to take things a step further and seek to avoid engaging in more 
negative diagnostic information seeking than is necessary to make valid selection 
decisions. In the case of a highly desirable candidate (i.e., one that is already determined 
to be highly qualified for the job), it may even be advisable to customize the selection 
procedure to minimize negative diagnostic information seeking for this high-value 
candidate. Conversely, if an organization desires to encourage applicants to self-select 
out of the recruiting process, they might seek to implement more negative diagnostic 
information seeking. Either way, organizations should be cognizant of and intentional in 
their use of negative diagnostic information seeking. For organizations, this paper 
identifies an actual practice to avoid and elucidates some of the theoretical outcomes, or 
detriments, associated with this practice. 
Moreover, given that hiring likelihood perceptions have been meta-analytically 
linked to a host of beneficial recruiting outcomes such as job pursuit intentions, 
attraction, acceptance intentions, and job choice (Chapman et al., 2005), the marginally 
significant negative impact of negative diagnostic information seeking on hiring 
likelihood perceptions (evidenced in Study 1) might give managers an additional reason 
to avoid utilizing negative diagnostic information seeking strategies more than is 
necessary. In comparison to the opportunity to collect information via positive diagnostic 
information seeking without negatively impacting hiring likelihood perceptions (positive 
diagnostic information seeking actually had a significant positive effect on hiring 
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likelihood perceptions in Study 2), the potentially unfavorable effects of negative 
diagnostic information seeking on hiring likelihood perceptions might be a nonfinancial 
cost that should be considered when management calculates the utility of certain staffing 
strategies. 
A particularly effective way to control and optimize the levels of negative 
diagnostic information seeking in the selection process could be the use of structured 
interviews. Given the plethora of evidence supporting the selection validity of structured 
interviews (McDaniel et al., 1994), the ideal level of negative diagnostic information 
seeking could become formalized and built into the structure of the interview itself. 
Combined with interviewer training on not only the structured interview but also the 
effective use of negative diagnostic information seeking, organizations might go far in 
avoiding the subtle, but potentially damaging, impacts of negative diagnostic information 
seeking. A corollary of this suggestion is that, without an understanding of negative 
diagnostic information seeking, organizations might be inadvertently structuring overly 
high levels of negative diagnostic information seeking into their selection processes 
without knowing it. This in turn may cause significant damage to the organization if this 
structure is indeed applied consistently across all job candidates over time. 
Conversely, positive diagnostic information seeking may be an information 
gathering strategy that also results in some additional benefits for organizations. As 
evidenced in Study 1, positive diagnostic information seeking (indirectly through felt 
obligation) led participants to intend to respond more quickly to organizations. Given that 
the management of timing issues are a very practical logistical concern for organizations 
during the staffing process (W. J. Becker et al., 2010), an information gathering strategy 
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that not only provides potential useful information for selection but also minimizes the 
time it would take for applicants to respond to job offers would be a win-win situation for 
organizations. Though one could argue that positive diagnostic information seeking 
might be taxing on job applicants’ time, the results presented support the notion that 
positive diagnostic information seeking is seen as a social exchange benefit. This 
suggests that if organizations utilize positive diagnostic information seeking strategies, 
they may be able to gather a large amount of information that might aid in selection 
decisions without negatively impacting applicant reactions. This is especially important 
given that many selection tools each add unique incremental validity in selection 
decisions (Schmidt & Hunter, 1998) and depend on the accumulation of information 
about the job applicant. 
From a human capital perspective, positive diagnostic information seeking can 
even represent a potential source of competitive advantage to organizations. Similar to 
arguments surrounding the utility of realistic job previews (Landis, Earnest, & Allen, 
2014), even small beneficial effects attributable to positive diagnostic information 
seeking might be of value to organizations as these information gathering strategies are 
essentially costless from a financial perspective. Results from the two studies identify the 
potential for organizations to gain benefits from positive diagnostic information seeking. 
Compared to corporate advertisements, which might have distinct and calculable 
financial costs (Collins & Han, 2004), favorable applicant perceptions might be bolstered 
quite economically through purposeful information seeking strategy design, with a 
particular emphasis on appropriately managing levels of positive diagnostic information 
seeking. More importantly, positive diagnostic information seeking is a somewhat subtle 
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behavior that might not be easily imitated by competitors thus potentially providing 
organizations that utilize positive diagnostic information seeking a source of competitive 
advantage (Wright, McMahan, & McWilliams, 1994). 
5.3 Future Research Directions 
The most impactful future research possibility with respect to the present paper 
would be to investigate the use of another mediator other than felt obligation. Although 
felt obligation did have significant direct effects on some of the dependent variables of 
interest and played a significant and marginally significant role as a mediator (Study 1), it 
is possible that more robust indirect effects for positive and negative diagnostic 
information seeking might be found by replacing felt obligation with another, more 
salient, social exchange mechanism. With respect to this, researchers have noted that 
there are multiple ways to measure the strength of social exchange relationships within 
the employee-organization relationship (Colquitt et al., 2014) which suggests that there 
are mediators which might be investigated in lieu of felt obligation. Further examination 
of results reveal that the direct effects of negative diagnostic information seeking on self-
imposed decision deadline length and negative word of mouth were significant (Study 1). 
In addition, negative diagnostic information seeking had a significant direct effect on 
self-imposed decision deadline length and faking in Study 2. Compared to the lack of 
support for indirect effects through felt obligation, finding evidence of these direct effects 
opens the possibility that other variables might more meaningfully mediate the 
relationship between negative diagnostic information seeking and information-based 
outcomes. In this way, there seems to be some relationship between information-based 
resources given to (or information-based costs not imposed on) applicants and the 
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reciprocation of information-based resources back to the organization. Altogether, future 
researchers might explore the possible mechanisms that might more substantially mediate 
the relationship between positive and negative diagnostic information seeking by the 
organization and applicants’ information-based reciprocation. One possible mechanism is 
organizational fairness. Specifically, Colquitt and Rodell (2015, p. 195) state that 
“fairness could be acting as one of the sentiments that encourages reciprocation in 
exchange-based theorizing.” Indeed, given the central role of applicants’ organizational 
fairness perceptions in predicting recruiting outcomes (Chapman et al., 2005), it is likely 
that fairness perceptions predict various beneficial attitudes and behaviors that might be 
conceptualized as social exchange reciprocation. This rationale is consistent with the 
findings from Study 2 which show a direct relationship between negative diagnostic 
information seeking and faking. Moreover, some of the control variables included in the 
present analyses provide possible ideas for meaningful mechanisms. In particular, 
prestige seems to play an important role in the information exchange process. While 
included in the model as a control variable, prestige was a significant predictor of four of 
the five dependent variables of interest in Study 1 (see Tables 4 and 5) and positive word 
of mouth in Study 2. Given that prestige represents a social consensus on the degree to 
which a company’s characteristics are regarded as normatively positive (Highhouse et al., 
2003), prestige may represent another social exchange mediator that taps into the 
desirability of a given organization as a social exchange partner. Correlations from Study 
1 and Study 2 both support this speculation. Specifically, in Study 1, there was a 
significant positive correlation (r = .24) between positive diagnostic information seeking 
and prestige while there was a significant negative relationship between negative 
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diagnostic information seeking and prestige (r = -.20). Similarly, positive diagnostic 
information seeking was significantly positively correlated with prestige in Study 2 (r = 
.58). Moreover, prestige was significantly negatively correlated with negative diagnostic 
information seeking in Study 2 (r = -.27). These results do seem to support the possibility 
that prestige is related to both diagnostic information seeking and the information-based 
dependent variables outlined in this paper. This opens the possibility for modeling 
prestige as a social exchange mechanism. 
The results presented might provide a baseline for future researchers to model 
multiple parallel mediators which may paint a more complex, but accurate, picture of the 
underlying social exchange phenomena addressed in this paper. In turn, this could allow 
researchers to examine more nuanced questions surrounding the dynamics of the social 
exchange process between applicants and organizations, such as competing explanations 
and questions of relative importance of mediators. Furthermore, future research might 
even examine the role of multiple mediators acting serially to affect information-based 
reciprocation. The inclusion of multiple serial mediators might reveal stronger indirect 
effects for positive and negative diagnostic information seeking and help researchers 
understand the extent to which positive and negative diagnostic information seeking 
plays a more distal role in affecting applicant reciprocation. 
Additionally, future research might attempt to replicate the significant findings in 
a field sample with a larger sample size to increase external validity. Beyond a sheer 
increase in the number of participants, future research should be directed at 
understanding whether the theoretical framework posited in this paper applies to other 
types of job seekers (e.g., unemployed individuals, fully employed individuals looking 
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for alternative opportunities, etc.). Though reviews of the job search literature suggest 
that a broad array of job seekers share common goals during the job search process 
(Boswell et al., 2012), it would be beneficial to substantiate this model in another 
population, perhaps in a full-time employee sample rather than a student sample. At the 
same time, it is important to note that while different populations of job seekers might 
have many similarities, the possibility exists that the social exchange processes driving 
the job search for these different populations might vary in a predictable way. Integrating 
this rationale with the aforementioned call for the investigation of more potent mediators, 
it could be possible that certain social exchange mediators might be more salient to 
certain sub-populations of job seekers (e.g., fully employed individuals might be more 
sensitive to organization fairness compared to unemployed individuals). As a result, job 
seeker type might be a relevant moderator that either suppresses or accentuates social 
exchange processes (i.e., a moderated mediation model). Similarly, researchers could 
further segment job seeker populations by occupation or industry as norms in these 
different contexts might act as moderators to social exchange dynamics. For example, 
negative diagnostic information seeking (e.g., background checks and other security-
enhancing screening techniques) may be more prevalent in governmental work given the 
sensitive nature of the tasks involved. 
Although the resource theory of social exchange (U. G. Foa & Foa, 1974, 1980) 
suggests that reciprocation is most likely made in-kind (i.e., information is reciprocated 
with information), there still exists instances where resources are not exchanged in-kind 
but instead other types of resources are reciprocated (e.g., status). For example, an 
individual might not reciprocate information for information received but instead could 
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reciprocate status for information received. According to the resource theory of social 
exchange, these “errors” are most likely to occur for two resources that are similar. Given 
that status and information share the common attribute of being low in concreteness, 
future research might examine whether the social exchange model outlined herein 
extends to other status-based (or even love-based), as opposed to information-based, 
dependent variables. Within the context of recruiting, organization attraction, which is 
narrower than prestige as it represents a particular individual’s affective and attitudinal 
thoughts about a given organization (Highhouse et al., 2003), might be a status-based 
resource of interest. Theoretical and empirical work in this area could provide a basis for 
further distinguishing the related constructs of prestige and organization attraction 
(Highhouse et al., 2003). Drawing again from the resource theory of social exchange, 
constructs such as organizational identification (Klein, Molloy, & Brinsfield, 2012), 
which tap into more distally related social resources (under the term “love”), might also 
prove to be relevant dependent variables. Further, these alternative dependent variables 
might be more likely to be reciprocated under certain contingencies. For example, an 
applicant might be more likely to identify with an organization if information 
reciprocation is somehow restricted due to strict formalization of recruiting and selection 
procedures. In this way, the voluntariness and free-flowing exchange of resources might 
be limited and applicant’s reciprocation might be less likely to be in kind. 
Similarly, future research may look at the provision of other information-based 
resources by the organization, most notably information disclosures. Research finds that 
the amount, specificity, and usefulness of the information provided to job applicants via 
the initial job advertisement (Feldman, Bearden, & Hardesty, 2006), organizational web 
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site (Allen, Mahto, & Otondo, 2007), job interview (Turban & Dougherty, 1992), and site 
visit (Saks & Uggerslev, 2010) tend to lead to greater organizational attraction. Indeed on 
a meta-analytic basis, recruiter informativeness is positively related to applicant’s job and 
organizational attraction (Chapman et al., 2005). In this way, information disclosures 
might be a form of information-based social exchange benefit provided to job applicants 
by organizations. Consequently, the theoretical model outlined in this paper might be 
expanded to include the consideration of information disclosure as an additional 
independent variable of interest. Furthermore, a subtle distinction exists between 
information disclosures and information seeking actions. Compared to information 
seeking, information disclosures do not place a normative burden on job applicants to 
respond. For example, it would be normatively inappropriate to be asked a question in an 
interview and not respond. In this way, information disclosures might be seen by job 
applicants as even more voluntary than information seeking, as there could be fewer 
expectations associated with information disclosures. As a result, this difference in 
“voluntariness” might drive different levels of job applicant reciprocation back to the 
organization depending on the nature of the initial social exchange benefit or cost 
provided. 
While this paper has depicted the social exchange relationship between a hiring 
organization and job applicant as initiated by actions of the hiring organization (i.e., 
positive and negative diagnostic information seeking), another perspective on the social 
exchange dynamics outlined herein could stem from actions of the job applicant that 
might initiate a positive social exchange between the applicant and representatives of the 
organization. As an example of a job applicant-initiated information exchange, consider 
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the situation where an applicant might voluntarily disclose information about themselves 
to the organization, even information that is not requested, such as their intentions to 
accept an offer or even reject an offer. In this way, the provision of information regarding 
acceptance intentions by job candidates might be useful to organizations for planning or 
logistical purposes, and thus serve as a form of information-based social exchange benefit 
provided to the organization. As a result, the possibility exists that a job applicant might 
initiate the social exchange relationship with a hiring organization by engaging in such 
actions and future research might examine these actions as independent variables that 
predict organizations’ reciprocation. 
Moreover, future research might be aimed at understanding the nature, and 
limitations of, felt obligation within the context of the employment relationship. Perhaps 
felt obligation is shaped by the context (e.g., job applicant-hiring organization 
relationship versus extant employee-organization relationship) and the expectations 
associated with a particular role (e.g., job candidate). For example, it is possible that job 
applicants’ obligations toward an organization can be fulfilled in more subtle ways that 
are less beneficial to organizations (e.g., simply submitting a job application or showing 
up to a scheduled interview on time). Qualitative inductive research might be conducted 
to gain an understanding of the expectations and interaction patterns that are considered 
normative by job applicants and hiring organizations. In this way, the social exchange 
mediator of felt obligation might manifest itself in ways unique to the staffing context 
that might warrant a different operationalization of the felt obligation construct. 
While the design of the two studies in this paper complemented each other with 
respect to examining the entire recruiting cycle (Barber, 1998), future research might aim 
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to directly address the temporal aspects of diagnostic information seeking by utilizing a 
completely within-individual design and surveying the same participants over multiple 
time periods. This research design may allow for the examination of a few interesting 
questions. For example, it is possible that time itself may moderate the effect of negative 
diagnostic information seeking where negative diagnostic information seeking conducted 
early on in the recruiting process might negatively impact candidate attitudes and 
perceptions (e.g., hiring likelihood perceptions) yet negative diagnostic information 
seeking conducted in later stages of the recruiting process (e.g., site visit) might be less 
impactful. Moreover, questions of consistency in information gathering strategy could be 
more appropriately answered by a within-individual design. For example, the trajectory 
of negative or positive diagnostic information seeking might uniquely impact applicant 
attitudes and perceptions as consistency in questioning strategies might serve to reduce 
applicant apprehension due to uncertainty.   
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Appendix A 
Study 1 Experiment Materials 
An organization has requested our assistance in evaluating its college recruiting practices. 
Your task is to take the role of an active job seeker and complete the organization’s 
application materials as if you are someone trying to obtain employment with the 
organization. Afterwards, you will be asked to provide your opinion on the application 
materials. To make the study more realistic, the organization will evaluate your 
application as if it were real and award a $5 Starbucks gift card to those students they 
would choose to “offer a job.” 
On the next page you will be shown application instructions and questions provided by 
the organization. When the timer reaches zero, continue to the next page to begin reading 
through the organization's instructions and completing their application as if you were an 
active job seeker that has never interacted with this organization before.  
Our organization is currently accepting applications for positions. Consideration of 
candidates will be based on the application materials below. To be considered, please 
answer the following questions to the best of your ability.  
(Participants are then randomly assigned to one of four conditions): 
Positive diagnostic information seeking manipulation 
1. “Describe a time when your work was praised.”  
2. “What is your strongest subject in school?”  
3. “What has been your most rewarding extracurricular activity (e.g., job, interest 
club, athletics, sorority/fraternity)?” 
4.  “Please describe a time where you helped improve your community.”  
5.  “What has been your biggest accomplishment to date (academic, personal, or 
professional)?” 
6. “What skill or expertise do you feel you’ve mastered?”  
7. “Describe an academic, personal, or professional experience you’ve had that will 
help you be a good employee.” 
8.  “What would others see as your personal strengths that might assist you in 
achieving your academic and professional goals?”  
Negative diagnostic information seeking manipulation 
1. “Describe a time when your work was criticized.”  
2. “What is your weakest subject in school?” 
3. “Describe your most severe violation of the academic honor code (e.g., cheated 
during an exam, copied homework, helped someone cheat during an exam, stolen 
an exam, etc.)?” 
4.  “Please describe any convictions you have had for a criminal offense, felony, or 
misdemeanor.”  
5. “What has been your biggest failure to date (academic, personal, or 
professional)?”  
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6. “What skill or expertise do you feel you’re lacking?” 
7. “Describe a conflict you have had with co-workers or classmates at any of your 
previous jobs or classes.” 
8. “What would others see as your personal weaknesses that might prevent you from 
achieving your academic and professional goals?” 
Positive and negative diagnostic information seeking manipulation 
1. “What skill or expertise do you feel you’ve mastered?”  
2. “What skill or expertise do you feel you’re lacking?”  
3. “What has been your biggest accomplishment to date (academic, personal, or 
professional)?” 
4. “What has been your biggest failure to date (academic, personal, or 
professional)?” 
5. “Describe an academic, personal, or professional experience you’ve had that will 
help you be a good employee.” 
6. “Describe a conflict you have had with co-workers or classmates at any of your 
previous jobs or classes.” 
7. “What would others see as your personal strengths that might assist you in 
achieving your academic and professional goals?” 
8.  “What would others see as your personal weaknesses that might prevent you 
from achieving your academic and professional goals?” 
Control condition  
1. “What is your preferred method of communicating with co-workers (e.g., e-mail, 
instant message, face-to-face, phone, video chat, or text message)?” 
2. “What personality type do you prefer to work with?” 
3. “When trying to make progress on an important project, do you usually stay late 
at work or go in early to work? Why?” 
4. “What functional area of an organization (e.g., human resources, marketing, IT, 
accounting, finance, operations management, etc.) do you think is most 
important? Why?” 
5. “How did you go about choosing a major?” 
6. “How do you organize your work day?” 
7. “What would you do if you were in a team meeting that was going over its 
scheduled time and you had another obligation to attend to?” 
8. “What is one question you would ask a potential employer before accepting a 
job?” 
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You have completed the first part of the application. As mentioned, we are helping the 
organization assess its recruiting practices. Based on your experiences with the 
organization today, please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the 
statements below. Please answer honestly. Your responses to the below opinion questions 
will not be seen or evaluated by the organization and will not impact your chances of 
receiving the gift card. 
(Survey questionnaire administered here) 
Thank you for providing your opinions on the first part of the job application. The second 
part of the application will begin on the next page. In this part, you will complete a task 
designed by the organization to assess how well a job applicant might deal with the 
uncertainties in the job search process. The objective in this task is to solve as many 
matrices as possible in 2 minutes. To solve a matrix you must find a pair of numbers that, 
when added together, equal 10. For example, the solution to the below matrix is: 4.81 and 
5.19. Please note: the organization will consider your performance on this task as part of 
their evaluation in determining whether you will receive a gift card. To ensure everyone’s 
matrices are the same difficulty, please solve the matrices in the order in which they 
appear, without skipping any. In other words, solve the first matrix before you move on 
to the next one. Please keep track of your progress as you will be asked to report how 
many matrices you solved correctly.   Click to continue when you are ready to start the 
task. The 2 minute timer will begin as soon as you go to the next page. 
(Matrix task administered here) 
Thank you for completing both parts of the application and opinion sections. Now, we 
would like to ask a few questions about you. This will help us to analyze our data. Your 
responses to the rest of the questions will not be seen or evaluated by the organization 
and will not impact your chances of receiving the gift card. 
(Ending survey questionnaire administered here)
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Appendix B 
Summary of results for exploratory analyses
   








EH1 Positive and negative diagnostic information seeking -> felt obligation n.s n.s
EH2 Positive and negative diagnostic information seeking -> hiring likelihood p ≤ .01 n.s
EH3 Positive and negative diagnostic information seeking X hiring likelihood -> felt obligation n.s n.s
EH4a Positive and negative diagnostic information seeking -> felt obligation -> self-imposed decision deadline n.s n.s
EH4b Positive and negative diagnostic information seeking -> felt obligation -> length of self-imposed decision deadline n.s n.s
EH4c Positive and negative diagnostic information seeking -> felt obligation -> positive word of mouth n.s n.s
EH4d Positive and negative diagnostic information seeking -> felt obligation -> negative word of mouth n.s n.s
EH4e Positive and negative diagnostic information seeking -> felt obligation -> faking n.s n.s
EH5a Positive and negative diagnostic information seeking X hiring likelihood -> felt obligation -> self-imposed decision deadline n.s n.s
EH5b Positive and negative diagnostic information seeking X hiring likelihood -> felt obligation -> length of self-imposed decision deadline n.s n.s
EH5c Positive and negative diagnostic information seeking X hiring likelihood-> felt obligation -> positive word of mouth n.s n.s
EH5d Positive and negative diagnostic information seeking X hiring likelihood -> felt obligation -> negative word of mouth n.s n.s
EH5e Positive and negative diagnostic information seeking X hiring likelihood -> felt obligation -> faking n.s n.s
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Appendix C 
Means, standard deviations, and correlations (Study 1 – Exploratory Analysis)
   
M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1. Positive affect 2.38 0.90 ---
2. Negative affect 1.30 0.42 .06 ---
3. Prestige 3.15 0.63 .41** -.13 ---
4 Positive diagnostic info. seeking1 0.24 0.43 .06 -.13 .18** ---
5. Negative diagnostic info. seeking2 0.27 0.44 -.13 .21** -.20** -.34** ---
6. Positive and negative diagnostic info. seeking3 0.23 0.42 .11 -.06 .08 -.31** -.33** ---
7. Hiring likelihood 3.01 0.75 .42** -.17* .49** .14* -.19** -.06 ---
8. Felt obligation 3.70 0.72 .37** -.08 .39** .16* -.21** .09 .31** ---
9. Self-imposed decision deadline 6.22 3.09 .28** -.08 .39** .06 -.20** .11 .37** .24** ---
10. Self-imposed decision deadline length 2.62 2.99 .07 -.06 .23** .00 .11 -.05 .16* .19** .41** ---
11. Positive word of mouth 3.03 0.83 .41** -.22** .73** .13 -.27** .12 .50** .45** .43** .17* ---
12. Negative word of mouth 2.22 0.84 -.20** .32** -.48** -.27** .44** -.01 -.38** -.32** -.33** -.12 -.50** ---
13 Faking 1.17 1.52 0.15* .08 0.17* .07 .07 .00 .04 .05 .02 .07 .12 .03
Note:  N = 210.
1Dummy Variable (1 = Positive diagnostic information seeking condition, 0 = Control)
2Dummy Variable (1 = Negative diagnostic information seeking condition, 0 = Control)
3Dummy Variable (1 = Positive and negative diagnostic information seeking condition, 0 = Control)




Summary of regression results on felt obligation and hiring likelihood (Study 1 – Exploratory Analysis)
   
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Variable B SE(B) β B SE(B ) β B SE(B) β B SE(B) β B SE(B) β
Constant 2.34** 0.29 2.38** 0.29 2.54** 0.32 -1.57** 0.28 -1.42** 0.28
Controls
Positive affect 0.21** 0.06 0.26** 0.20** 0.06 0.25** 0.19** 0.06 0.23** 0.23** 0.05 0.28** 0.24** 0.05 0.28**
Negative affect -0.10 0.11 -0.06 -0.05 0.11 -0.03 -0.03 0.11 -0.02 -0.26* 0.11 -0.14* -0.24* 0.11 -0.14*
Prestige 0.32** 0.08 0.28** 0.29** 0.08 0.25** 0.23* 0.09 0.20* 0.43** 0.08 0.36** 0.43** 0.08 0.36**
Predictors
Positive diagnostic information seeking1 0.14 0.13 0.08 0.17 0.13 0.10 -0.11 0.12 -0.07
Negative diagnostic information seeking2 -0.13 0.13 -0.08 -0.09 0.13 -0.06 -0.24* 0.12 -0.14*
Positive and negative diagnostic information seeking3 0.07 0.13 0.04 0.10 0.13 0.06 -0.35** 0.12 -0.20**
Hiring likelihood 0.12 0.12 0.12
Interactions
Positive diagnostic information seeking X hiring likelihood -0.08 0.17 -0.04
Negative diagnostic information seeking X hiring likelihood 0.02 0.16 0.01
Positive and negative diagnostic information seeking X hiring likelihood -0.13 0.21 -0.05
R .45** .47** .48** .56** .59**
R 2 .20** .22** .23** .32** .35**
∆R 2 .02 .01 .03*
Adjusted R 2 .19 .20 .19 .31 .33
Note:  N  = 210. 
1Dummy Variable (1 = Positive diagnostic information seeking condition, 0 = Control)
2Dummy Variable (1 = Negative diagnostic information seeking condition, 0 = Control)
3Dummy Variable (1 = Positive and negative diagnostic information seeking condition, 0 = Control)
 † p ≤ .10. * p ≤ .05. ** p ≤ .01. 
Felt Obligation Felt ObligationFelt Obligation Hiring Likelihood Hiring Likelihood
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Appendix E 
Summary of regression results on establishment of self-imposed decision deadlines and length of self-imposed decision 
deadlines (Study 1 – Exploratory Analysis)
   
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Variable B SE(B ) β B SE(B ) β B SE(B ) β B SE(B ) β B SE(B ) β B SE(B ) β
Constant 0.54 1.24 0.84 1.27 0.19 1.47 -0.41 1.28 -0.87 1.30 -2.40 1.49
Controls
Positive affect 0.53* 0.24 0.16* 0.49* 0.24 0.14* 0.44† 0.25 0.13† -0.07 0.25 -0.02 -0.02 0.25 -0.01 -0.15 0.25 -0.04
Negative affect -0.39 0.47 -0.05 -0.24 0.48 -0.03 -0.23 0.48 -0.03 -0.24 0.49 -0.03 -0.49 0.49 -0.07 -0.46 0.49 -0.07
Prestige 1.56** 0.35 0.32** 1.51** 0.35 0.31** 1.43** 0.36 0.29** 1.12** 0.36 0.24** 1.24** 0.36 0.26** 1.06** 0.37 0.22**
IVs
Positive diagnostic information seeking1 -0.28 0.56 -0.04 -0.32 0.56 -0.04 -0.03 0.57 -0.01 -0.12 0.57 -0.02
Negative diagnostic information seeking2 -0.79 0.55 -0.11 -0.75 0.55 -0.11 1.16* 0.56 0.17* 1.24* 0.56 0.19*
Positive and negative diagnostic information seeking3 0.16 0.56 0.02 0.14 0.56 0.02 -0.11 0.58 -0.02 -0.15 0.57 -0.02
Mediator
Felt Obligation 0.28 0.31 0.07 0.64* 0.31 0.16*
R .42** .43** .43** .23* .29** .32**
R 2 .17** .19** .19** .06** .09** .06**
∆R 2 .01 .00 .03† .02*
Adjusted R 2 .16 .16 .16 .04 .06 .07
Note:  N  = 210. 
1Dummy Variable (1 = Positive diagnostic information seeking condition, 0 = Control)
2Dummy Variable (1 = Negative diagnostic information seeking condition, 0 = Control)
3Dummy Variable (1 = Positive and negative diagnostic information seeking condition, 0 = Control)
 † p ≤ .10. * p ≤ .05. ** p ≤ .01. 
Self-Imposed Decision Self-Imposed Decision Self-Imposed Deadline Length Self-Imposed Deadline LengthSelf-Imposed Decision Self-Imposed Deadline Length
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Appendix F 
Summary of regression results on positive word of mouth and negative word of mouth (Study 1 – Exploratory Analysis)
   
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Variable B SE(B ) β B SE(B ) β B SE(B ) β B SE(B ) β B SE(B ) β B SE(B ) β
Constant 0.39 0.24 0.49* 0.25 0.07 0.28 3.39** 0.31 3.07** 0.29 3.39** 0.33
Controls
Positive affect 0.14** 0.05 0.16** 0.13** 0.05 0.15** 0.10* 0.05 0.11* -0.03 0.06 -0.04 -0.02 0.06 -0.02 0.01 0.06 0.01
Negative affect -0.28* 0.09 -0.14* -0.25* 0.09 -0.13* -0.24** 0.09 -0.12** 0.54** 0.12 0.27** 0.41** 0.11 0.21** 0.41** 0.11 0.20**
Prestige 0.84** 0.07 0.65** 0.84** 0.07 0.64** 0.79** 0.07 0.60** -0.57** 0.09 -0.43** -0.51** 0.08 -0.38** -0.47** 0.08 -0.36**
IVs
Positive diagnostic information seeking1 -0.12 0.11 -0.06 -0.14 0.11 -0.07 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.02 0.13 0.01
Negative diagnostic information seeking2 -0.22* 0.11 -0.12* -0.20† 0.10 -0.11† 0.70** 0.13 0.37** 0.68** 0.13 0.36**
Positive and negative diagnostic information seeking3 -0.02 0.11 -0.01 -0.03 0.11 -0.02 0.32* 0.13 0.16* 0.33* 0.13 0.16*
Mediator
Felt Obligation 0.18** 0.06 0.16** -0.13† 0.07 -0.12†
R .75** .76** .77** .55** .64** .65**
R 2 .56** .57** .59** .30** .42** .40**
∆R 2 .01 .02** .11** .01†
Adjusted R 2 .56 .56 .58 .29 .40 .41
Note:  N  = 210. 
1Dummy Variable (1 = Positive diagnostic information seeking condition, 0 = Control)
2Dummy Variable (1 = Negative diagnostic information seeking condition, 0 = Control)
3Dummy Variable (1 = Positive and negative diagnostic information seeking condition, 0 = Control)
 † p ≤ .10. * p ≤ .05. ** p ≤ .01. 
Positive Word of Mouth Positive Word of Mouth Negative Word of Mouth Negative Word of MouthPositive Word of Mouth Negative Word of Mouth
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Appendix G 
Summary of regression results on faking (Study 1 - Exploratory Analysis)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Variable B SE(B ) β B SE(B ) β B SE(B ) β
Constant -0.69 0.66 -0.96 0.67 -0.81 0.78
Controls
Positive affect 0.15 0.13 0.09 0.16 0.13 0.10 0.17 0.13 0.10
Negative affect 0.33 0.25 0.09 0.27 0.26 0.08 0.27 0.26 0.08
Prestige 0.34† 0.18 0.14† 0.34† 0.19 0.14† 0.36† 0.19 0.15†
IVs
Positive diagnostic information seeking1 0.44 0.29 0.13 0.45 0.30 0.13
Negative diagnostic information seeking2 0.55† 0.29 0.16† 0.54† 0.29 0.16†
Positive and negative diagnostic information seeking3 0.27 0.30 0.07 0.27 0.30 0.08
Mediator
Felt Obligation -0.06 0.16 -0.03
R .21* .25* .25†
R 2 .04* .06* .06†
∆R 2 .02 .00
Adjusted R 2 .03 .04 .03
Note:  N  = 210. 
1Dummy Variable (1 = Positive diagnostic information seeking condition, 0 = Control)
2Dummy Variable (1 = Negative diagnostic information seeking condition, 0 = Control)
3Dummy Variable (1 = Positive and negative diagnostic information seeking condition, 0 = Control)




Unstandardized indirect effect of positive and negative diagnostic information seeking (through felt obligation) and the 






Index of moderated mediation and the associated 95% confidence intervals (Study 1- Exploratory Analysis) 
Moderating effect of hiring likelihood perceptions on the effect of positive and negative diagnostic information seeking 
through felt obligation 
 
  





Positive Word of 
Mouth
Negative Word of 
Mouth Faking
Positive and negative diagnostic information seeking1,2 0.14 0.14 0.07 -0.04 0.02
(-.06, .52) (-.06, .53) (-.04, .21) (-.14, .02) (-.02, .15)
Note:  N  = 210. 
1Dummy Variable (1 = Positive and negative diagnostic information seeking condition, 0 = Control)
2Controls (mediator): prestige, positive affect, and negative affect; controls (independent variable): negative diagnostic information seeking and positive diagnostic information seeking
 † p ≤ .10. * p ≤ .05. ** p ≤ .01. 
Self-Imposed Deadline Self-Imposed Deadline Length
Positive Word of 
Mouth
Negative Word of 
Mouth Faking
Positive and negative diagnostic information seeking1,2 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.00
(-.30, .10) (-.42, .20) (-.10, .05) (-.04, .10) (-.05, .12)
Note:  N  = 210. 
1Dummy Variable (1 = Positive and negative diagnostic information seeking condition, 0 = Control)
2Controls (mediator): prestige, positive affect, and negative affect; controls (independent variable): negative diagnostic information seeking, positive diagnostic information seeking, and hiring likelihood
 † p ≤ .10. * p ≤ .05. ** p ≤ .01. 
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Appendix J 
Summary of hypotheses testing for supplemental analysis
  
Study 1 no 
controls
Study 1 full 
sample
Study 1 full 
sample no 
controls
H1 Positive diagnostic information seeking -> felt obligation p ≤ .08 n.s. n.s.
H2 Positive diagnostic information seeking -> hiring likelihood n.s. n.s. n.s.
H3 Negative diagnostic information seeking -> felt obligation n.s. n.s. p ≤ .05
H4 Negative diagnostic information seeking -> hiring likelihood p ≤ .05 n.s. p ≤ .05
H5a Positive diagnostic information seeking X hiring likelihood -> felt obligation n.s. n.s. n.s.
H5b Negative diagnostic information seeking X hiring likelihood -> felt obligation n.s. n.s. n.s.
H6a Felt obligation -> self-imposed decision deadline p ≤ .01 n.s. p ≤ .01
H6b Felt obligation -> length of self-imposed decision deadline p ≤ .01 p ≤ .05 p ≤ .01
H7a Felt obligation -> positive word of mouth p ≤ .01 p ≤ .01 p ≤ .01
H7b Felt obligation -> negative word of mouth p ≤ .05 p ≤ .08 p ≤ .01
H8 Felt obligation -> faking n.s. n.s. n.s.
H9a Positive diagnostic information seeking -> felt obligation -> self-imposed decision deadline p ≤ .07 n.s. n.s.
H9b Positive diagnostic information seeking -> felt obligation -> length of self-imposed decision deadline p ≤ .05 p ≤ .10 p ≤ .09
H9c Positive diagnostic information seeking -> felt obligation -> positive word of mouth p ≤ .08 n.s. p ≤ .05
H9d Positive diagnostic information seeking -> felt obligation -> negative word of mouth p ≤ .07 n.s. n.s.
H9e Positive diagnostic information seeking -> felt obligation -> faking n.s. n.s. n.s.
H10a Negative diagnostic information seeking -> felt obligation -> self-imposed decision deadline p ≤ .08 n.s. p ≤ .05
H10b Negative diagnostic information seeking -> felt obligation -> length of self-imposed decision deadline p ≤ .06 p ≤ .05 p ≤ .05
H10c Negative diagnostic information seeking -> felt obligation -> positive word of mouth p ≤ .10 p ≤ .05 p ≤ .05
H10d Negative diagnostic information seeking -> felt obligation -> negative word of mouth p ≤ .09 p ≤ .10 p ≤ .05
H10e Negative diagnostic information seeking -> felt obligation -> faking n.s. n.s. n.s.
H11a Positive diagnostic information seeking X hiring likelihood -> felt obligation -> self-imposed decision deadline n.s. n.s. n.s.
H11b Positive diagnostic information seeking X hiring likelihood -> felt obligation -> length of self-imposed decision deadline n.s. n.s. n.s.
H11c Positive diagnostic information seeking X hiring likelihood-> felt obligation -> positive word of mouth n.s. n.s. n.s.
H11d Positive diagnostic information seeking X hiring likelihood -> felt obligation -> negative word of mouth n.s. n.s. n.s.
H11e Positive diagnostic information seeking X hiring likelihood -> felt obligation -> faking n.s. n.s. n.s.
H12a Negative diagnostic information seeking X hiring likelihood -> felt obligation -> self-imposed decision deadline n.s. n.s. n.s.
H12b Negative diagnostic information seeking X hiring likelihood -> felt obligation -> length of self-imposed decision deadline n.s. n.s. n.s.
H12c Negative diagnostic information seeking X hiring likelihood-> felt obligation -> positive word of mouth n.s. n.s. n.s.
H12d Negative diagnostic information seeking X hiring likelihood -> felt obligation -> negative word of mouth n.s. n.s. n.s.
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